Buffalo Law Review
Volume 66

Number 4

Article 4

8-1-2018

From Marriage to Households: Towards Equal Treatment of
Intimate Forms of Life
Deborah Zalesne
City University of New York School of Law

Adam Dexter
Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division, Second Department

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Family Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Deborah Zalesne & Adam Dexter, From Marriage to Households: Towards Equal Treatment of Intimate
Forms of Life, 66 Buff. L. Rev. 909 (2018).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol66/iss4/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

Buffalo Law Review
VOLUME 66

AUGUST 2018

NUMBER 4

From Marriage to Households: Towards
Equal Treatment of Intimate Forms of Life
DEBORAH ZALESNE† & ADAM DEXTER‡
When the civil magistrate sought to justify his reign, he preached
to the people that under his rule they are free and equal: free to
pursue their conceptions of the good life and equal under the law.
For word of the good news to reach the people, the civil magistrate
invited citizens from each community under his jurisdiction to hear
him preach: Joseph, Gautama, Sarah, Aisha, Hillary, and Isa, each
of whom was pursuing his or her own conceptions of the good life by
choosing associations fit for them.
Joseph was recently wed to Mary at their church. The civil
magistrate told him, “I approve of your union and will recognize it.
Further, I will weigh your union as a factor when making policy so
as to provide you benefits and protections with respect to it.”
Gautama lived permanently with Steve and Bob in a tantric trio
of love and commitment. The civil magistrate told him, “I disapprove
of your union and I will not recognize it. Further, I will not weigh
your union as a factor when making policy and therefore will provide
you no benefits and protections with respect to it.”
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Sarah was Rebecca’s sister. Together they took care of Sarah’s
child, Ruth. The civil magistrate told her, “I disapprove of your
union and I will not recognize it. Further, I will not weigh your union
as a factor when making policy and therefore will provide you no
benefits and protections with respect to it.”
Aisha was also a “single mother,” raising her child, Joshua, with
her father, Ishmael (Joshua’s grandfather). The civil magistrate told
her, “I disapprove of your union and I will not recognize it. Further,
I will not weigh your union as a factor when making policy and
therefore will provide you no benefits and protections with respect to
it.”
Hillary sought to join Debra and Sappho as sister-wives in a
polygamous relationship with their husband, Denis. The civil
magistrate told her, “I disapprove of your union and I will not
recognize it. Further, I will not weigh your union as a factor when
making policy and therefore will provide you no benefits and
protections with respect to it. Moreover, Hillary, I will lock you up.”
Isa then approached, and with an eye on the magistrate who was
so hurtful toward Hillary, said to the citizens, “that the hypocrite
reign not, lest the people be ensnared.”1

INTRODUCTION
Laws and attitudes around marriage have changed
drastically in our own history and are widely different across
cultures. Same-sex marriage is now legal, polyamorous
relationships are on the rise, and, as an empirical matter,
marriage serves a different purpose than it did as little as
forty years ago—marriage is no longer a prerequisite for
sexual intimacy, cohabitation, or parenthood. There are no
essential elements to a definition of marriage to which the
State can appeal without arbitrarily restricting citizens’
possibilities concerning their most intimate relationships.
Therefore, because any State-sanctioned version of marriage
will be arbitrary, as illustrated in the introductory vignette,
the only justified form of marriage the State can sanction is
marriage in the form of a contract, treated like any other
contract.
From this premise, we propose a shift from “marriage”
as a unique status with membership based on State

1. Job 34:30 (King James).
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approval, to the broader notion of “household” as a contract
with the parties themselves determining the members.
Under this new legal approach, “households” supplant
marriages as the atomistic factor in policymaking and social
thinking. Households would replace marriages in receiving
the State allocated benefits traditionally provided to married
couples,2 but the parties themselves would define who is a
member of the household. Unlike marriage, the notion of
contractual household formation does not depend on a sexual
relationship. Equal treatment of independent relationships,
free of State-imposed membership requirements, respects
autonomy and diversity. Household constitution is grounded
in voluntary choice and subject to the standard contract
defenses concerned with illusory assent.
Adducing the endless variety of intimate relations
throughout history and across cultures, coupled with the
principle that citizens should be free to pursue intimate
arrangements fit for them, we set out to justify the claim that
formal recognition of family formation should not be limited
to couples, but must include the freedom to pursue
arrangements involving more than two people. The State no
longer regulates legally recognized family relations by sex,
gender, race, continuity, and marital property. We argue
that the regulation of number is equally ripe for reform.
Insofar as there is only one form of marriage, it cannot fairly
be said that the decision to enter that marriage is a choice in
the meaningful sense, since true choice demands alternative
feasible arrangements. When the civil magistrate endows
preferential treatment on one marital arrangement, the
supreme power of the State’s coercive capacity unduly
influences one’s choice.

2. We see a compelling argument that the State should not confer any special
benefits based on relationship status, but should rather provide basic protections
to all citizens. However, this Article stops short of proposing the complete
elimination of marriage. Instead, to the extent that marriage exists, and as long
as the State imposes obligations and grants benefits to married people, we
propose expanding the categories of people who qualify.
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We justify our approach on established principles of
political liberalism and classical contract law, finding
common trends toward openness and autonomy between the
two traditions. A central tenet of political liberalism is State
neutrality with respect to “the good life,” whereby the State
provides the conditions for the actualization of human
purposes without sanctioning one form of life over another.3
Especially in a pluralistic society such as the United States,
for the State to favor this or that form of life is either to
discriminate against those who live differently or to narrow
the range of options for citizens arbitrarily, thereby
supplanting organic society’s variety and richness of human
life with a prescribed homogeneity. Likewise, principles of
contract
law—autonomy,
self-determination,
willing
cooperation, and consent to association—also demand an
absence of arbitrary restrictions on private choice.
Nonetheless, that there are three parties to the marriage
contract, two spouses and the State, secures for the State the
power not only to recognize, but also to design family
relationships, promoting one way of life among many
possibilities.4 The State legally favors traditionally married
couples in areas as varied as tax preferences,5 evidentiary
privileges,6
immigration
status,7
medical
issues,8

3. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 4–6 (1993).
4. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003)
(noting that, “[i]n a real sense, there are three partners to every civil
marriage: two willing spouses and an approving State”).
5. There are approximately fifty-nine provisions in the Federal Income Tax
Code in which tax liability depends on marital status. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO/GGD-96-175 TAX ADMINISTRATION: INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF
MARRIED AND SINGLE INDIVIDUALS 3 (1996).
6. Married spouses are entitled to both spousal immunity and privileged
confidential marital communications under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See
FED. R. EVID. 501; FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee’s notes to 1974
enactment.
7. Unmarried couples do not have the ability to petition for their alien
partner under current immigration laws. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(k) (2012).
8. For example, married couples benefit from the Family and Medical Leave
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government benefits such as Social Security,9 hospital
visits,10 inheritance,11 wrongful death and loss of consortium
actions,12 and bankruptcy protections,13 among others.14 In
addition, neither Title VII15 nor the Fair Housing Act16
prohibits marital status discrimination.17 The 1990s welfare
reform particularly favored marriage and hurt unmarried
women by incentivizing states to reduce out of wedlock
Act (FMLA), which requires covered employers to grant employees up to twelve
weeks of unpaid leave per year for the care of an immediate family member with
a serious medical condition. While the FMLA has a broad definition of child,
including the child of a person standing in loco parentis, the term “spouse” is
limited to husband and wife. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(12)–(13) (2012).
9. When no other condition applies, Social Security benefits pass to a
surviving spouse so long as they have been married for at least nine months.
42 U.S.C. § 416(c) (2012).
10. The most famous case is that of Sharon Kowalski, in which her parents
were able to legally deny her same-sex partner guardianship and hospital
visitation. In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986).
11. Among other estate distribution benefits, married couples are entitled to
a tenancy by the entirety when their partner dies, JOHN G. SPRANKLING,
UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 133 (2d ed. 2007), and benefit from a marital tax
deduction from estate and gift taxes for all property left to a spouse. 26 U.S.C.
§§ 2056, 2523 (2012).
12. Many states do not provide wrongful death standing to non-marital
partners, and even if a state does provide such rights, the benefits are extended
only to those who register and not to all non-marital couples. John G. Culhane,
Even More Wrongful Death: Statutes Divorced from Reality, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.
J. 171, 172 (2005).
13. A husband and wife can opt to file for bankruptcy jointly. 11 U.S.C. § 302
(2012).
14. Children of married couples are also unduly privileged. Laws emanating
from the prevailing law towards marriage generally have created classifications
between legitimate and illegitimate children, in many cases to the detriment of
children born to unmarried parents. For example, in immigration law, children
born out of wedlock must establish paternity, whereas a child born in wedlock is
presumed to be the offspring of the husband. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (b)(1)(A)–(D) (2012).
The presumption is yet another coercive measure pushing people toward a
specifically designed end.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
16. Id. §§ 3601–3619.
17. Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation, 75
TEMP. L. REV. 709, 790 (2002).
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births.18 Social policy does more than “nudge” individuals
into recognized marital relations.
Privileging married persons with government benefits
and special taxation treatment violates basic principles of
political liberalism.19 With regard to family law in general,
and the law around marriage formation in particular, two
questions arise. First, an empirical question: Does the law
restrict or unduly burden otherwise private, organic
institutional conduct? And second, a normative question: If
the law does in fact restrict such conduct, is the restricted
conduct harmful or unjust? If not, the State is violating basic
principles of human dignity and autonomy by interfering
with private, free choice. We will show the State’s privileging
of monogamous marital relations is based not on the grounds
that alternative forms of relationships are inherently
harmful, but rather, on parochial grounds. We propose that
the criminalization and non-recognition of multiple marriage
or polyamorous marital relationships is, for example,
motivated by religious animus and “proper” Victorian ethics
rather than legitimate state ends.
Marriage is most fairly and justly conceived as a contract
because the principles and values underpinning contract law
18. Ruthann Robson, Compulsory Matrimony, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL
THEORY 313, 317–18 (Martha Albertson Fineman et al. eds., 2009).
19. See generally ELIZABETH BRAKE, MINIMIZING MARRIAGE: MARRIAGE,
MORALITY, AND THE LAW 168 (2012) (arguing that marriage should be modeled on
friendship rather than romantic union); CLARE CHAMBERS, AGAINST MARRIAGE:
AN EGALITARIAN DEFENCE OF THE MARRIAGE-FREE STATE (2017) (arguing that civil
marriage violates liberal neutrality); TAMARA METZ, UNTYING THE KNOT:
MARRIAGE, THE STATE, AND THE CASE FOR THEIR DIVORCE 7 (2010) (arguing that
civil marriage privileges some views of the good life at the expense of others);
Jeremy R. Garrett, Marriage Unhitched from the State: A Defense, 23 PUB. AFF.
Q. 161, 167–68 (2009) (arguing that civil marriage devalues “alternative ways of
life, including living singly, cohabiting, and other forms of nonrecognized
partnering.”). But see Simon Cabulea May, Liberal Neutrality and Civil
Marriage, in AFTER MARRIAGE: RETHINKING MARITAL RELATIONSHIPS 9 (Elizabeth
Brake ed., 2016) [hereinafter AFTER MARRIAGE] (offering a defense of marriage as
compatible with liberalism); Ralph Wedgwood, Is Civil Marriage Illiberal?, in
AFTER MARRIAGE, supra note 19, at 29 (offering a defense of marriage as
compatible with liberalism).
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are borrowed from a more general conception of a free human
being.20 The formalization of intimate relations and family
formation is so central to one’s identity that general
principles of human freedom are replaced by parochial
institutional conceptions of “proper” conduct only at the price
of selling short human dignity and autonomy. A just
spectrum correlates the degree of autonomy warranted with
the strength of the privacy claim.
Those critical of contract as panacea might argue that,
because women contract from an already subordinated
position, modern patriarchy is legitimized through
contract,21 and therefore our contractual paradigmatic
method is naïve. Carole Pateman argues in the influential
Sexual Contract, for example, that “for marriage to become
merely a contract of sexual use . . . would mark the political
defeat of women as women.”22 Such criticism, however, is
rendered moot when we decouple marriage from sexuality
entirely and take the household as the central unit,
permitting associations of women, associations of men,
mixed polyamorous arrangements, and even modern
polygamy. The end of marital rape exceptions, the existence
of which Pateman heavily relies on for her claim that civil
contract secures male sex-right, was the first step in decoupling sexuality from marriage.23 We have many more
steps ahead.
20. Others have argued for the abolition of marriage as a legal category and
promoted the use of contract instead. See, e.g., MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED
MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 228–30
(1995). See generally LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: SPOUSES,
LOVERS AND THE LAW 255–333 (1981).
21. E.g., CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 2 (1988).
22. Id. at 187. For Pateman, the correspondence of “man” with “individual” is
so embedded in our political and legal culture that to make a “woman” an
individual is to make women like men, thereby denying concrete sexual
difference. Pateman argues the social contract the “canonical” theorists
hypothesized included, in addition to the creation of civil society among men, the
transformation of man’s “natural right over women into the security of civil
patriarchal right.” Id. at 6.
23. Id. at 7.
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Polygamy is one feasible alternative to monogamy that
tests our allegiance to basic principles of liberalism and
classical contract law.24 It is true that historically,
polygamous relationships have been characterized by
exploitation and oppression of women, and that the practice
of polygamy often coincides with crimes targeting women
and children, such as incest, sexual assault, statutory rape,
and failure to pay child support.25 But inequality within the
household and oppressive patriarchal forces are not inherent
to polygamy any more than exploitation of workers is
inherent to a free market. Just as pre-existing inequalities,
concentrated wealth, and competing job applicants with little
bargaining power create the conditions for the exploitation of
workers, patriarchal ideology, religious fanaticism, laws and
norms limiting the education and professionalization of
women, and economic dependence on men create the
conditions for exploitation of women in polygamous (and
monogamous) marriage. 26 Proper polygamy—the right to
marry multiple, consenting, age-appropriate partners of
whatever gender—is not inherently harmful or unjust.
24. A variety of other scholars have argued for state recognition of polygamy.
See, e.g., Cheshire Calhoun, Who’s Afraid of Polygamous Marriage? Lessons for
Same-Sex Marriage Advocacy from the History of Polygamy, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1023 (2005); Casey E. Faucon, Marriage Outlaws: Regulating Polygamy in
America, 22 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2014) (setting out “a regulatory
scheme that not only legalizes polygamy, but also develops regulatory rules to
ensure consent, prevent unequal bargaining power between the parties, and
protect individual rights”); Andrew F. March, Is There a Right to Polygamy?
Marriage, Equality and Subsidizing Families in Liberal Public Justification, 8 J.
MORAL PHIL. 246 (2011); Peter de Marneffe, Liberty and Polygamy, in AFTER
MARRIAGE, supra note 19, at 125 (arguing that although polygamy should not be
legally recognized, it should nonetheless be decriminalized); Laurie Shrage,
Polygamy, Privacy, and Equality, in AFTER MARRIAGE, supra note 19, at 160
(arguing that problems of oppression posed by polygamy are no different from
those posed by monogamy, and making the case for egalitarian polygamy and
bigamy).
25. See generally Richard A. Vazquez, The Practice of Polygamy: Legitimate
Free Exercise of Religion or Legitimate Public Menace? Revisiting Reynolds in
Light of Modern Constitutional Jurisprudence, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y
225, 239–45 (2001).
26. See infra notes 177–81 and accompanying text.
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Traditionally oppressive forms of polygamy have no bearing
on the issue of whether, within the liberal paradigm,
polygamy as such is morally permissible and whether it
should be legally so. Americans’ immediate associations of
polygamy with the other race of people or the other religion
are cause for initial skepticism of our intuitions about what
is unjust or harmful.
Important clarifications help specify the nature of our
argument. First, we are not arguing that a world with more
multiple marriage is preferable to a world with less; rather,
we argue for the moral and legal permissibility27 of various
household arrangements for the sake of actual adherence to
principles of liberalism and classical contract law. Other
arrangements deserving of equal State treatment include
nonsexual partnerships, temporary marriages, polyamorous
arrangements, co-habiting couples, and multi-generational
cohabitation, such as a mother and grandmother raising a
child, among others—all equally “households.” We make the
larger claim that the law around marriage should be
reformed so as to better resemble the classical contract
paradigm, permitting the parties to contract for whatever
arrangements that are both fit for them and morally
permissible. Our preoccupation with State neutrality is
based on the fundamental principle of justice as fairness.
Second, monogamy, polygamy, and polyamory 28 are
normatively idealized forms of life debased by their
27. Moral theory generally consists of three categories: (1) moral; (2) immoral;
and (3) morally permissible. ANNE THOMSON, CRITICAL REASONING IN ETHICS: A
PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION 12 (1999). For instance, when walking by a pond and
seeing a drowning child, the moral course of action would be to help the child and
the immoral course of action would be to ignore the child. But what is the moral
status of the choice to sing the song Hero, written by Enrique Iglesias (2001),
while saving the child? Doing so would be neither moral nor immoral. Singing
would neither help nor hurt the child nor anyone else. Thus, singing Hero while
saving the child would be merely morally permissible. Id.
28. Polyamory is the practice of having ongoing intimate and/or romantic
relationships with more than one person, whether independent relationships or
unions of three or more people. Ann Tweedy, Polyamory as a Sexual Orientation,
79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1461, 1479 (2011).
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corresponding actual practices. Christianity and Islam are
also normatively idealized forms of life, as are republicanism
and democracy. All have meanings inherently contested by
their participants but mean in each case that form of life for
which human beings may choose to strive to achieve. Just as
specific instances of “Islamic terrorism” or repressive
theocracy do not condemn Islam, specific examples of
patriarchal polygamous practices do not condemn multiple
marriage as such.
Thus informed by the virtues and vision of political
liberalism and freedom of contract, we propose two general
principles of law around marriage or civil unions. The first
principle is that the state should involve itself no further in
family formation than to enforce private contractual
arrangements made on the basis of meaningful choice.
“Meaningful choice” here means the free pursuit of one
option among conceived feasible alternatives. That is, a
choice is only a choice if other options are available. The
second principle is that in the area of family law, the law
should accommodate organic society’s spontaneous forms
rather than the other way around. Here, abstract
conceptions of marriage are often at odds with the reality.
Some features of current marriage law have become
anachronistic oddities given the current state of society,
especially considering the progress made on women’s
rights.29 The law should follow the cultural shift away from

29. As examples, marital property is the lingering effect of coverture and the
reluctance of law enforcement to effectively criminalize abuse within the family
is a lingering effect of marital rape exemptions. Relatedly, continued income gaps
between men and women are the lingering effect of assumed gender roles within
the family where the husband concerns himself with the public sphere and the
wife with the private sphere, even though more women are graduating from
college with professional degrees than ever. See INSTITUTE OF EDUCATIONAL
SERVICES: NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, DEGREES CONFERRED BY
DEGREE-GRANTING POSTSECONDARY INSTITUTIONS, BY LEVEL OF DEGREE AND SEX OF
STUDENT (2013), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d13/tables/dt13 _318.10.asp
(reporting that in 2012, 57.3% of those who graduated with a bachelor’s degree
were women as compared to 55.1% in 1995; and 59.9% of those who earned a
master’s degree were women in 2012 as compared to 55.5% in 1995).
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marriage and toward family formations as varied as single
parenthood, romantic cohabitation without marriage, and
polyamory.
The circularity of the claim that marriage should be
between two persons because marriage is defined as
consisting of two people should be clear. What is the source
of the definition? Can anything but tradition and prejudice
make it ostensibly legitimate? Arguments on both sides, that
evolutionary biology and evolutionary psychology produce
evidence that monogamy is either, for the most part,
“natural”30 or “unnatural,”31 commit the naturalistic fallacy32
and hardly factor into our analysis.
Here, similarly, we seek to de-naturalize and impregnate
with possibility the idea of “marriage” to the point that it is
more precisely called a household. While traditional
marriage will likely remain popular, the broader notion of
households justly and fairly accommodates the endless
variety of morally permissible family forms determined by
the participants.
Accordingly, based on overlapping principles of political
liberalism and classical contract law, Part I asserts that the
State should not be involved with family formation other
than to enforce private contracts. This Section surveys the
long history of the State’s unjustified intrusion into the
institution of marriage as well as current trends related to
marriage and polygamy, highlighting the importance of
State neutrality and the need for reform. Part II then
proposes a shift from marriage as a status to household as a
contract. As a model, we look to the law of business
partnerships, which does not limit the number of
participants but allows the business relationship to be

30. See ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL 59 (1994).
31. CHRISTOPHER RYAN & CACILDA JETHÁ, SEX
ORIGINS OF MODERN SEXUALITY 46 (2010).

AT

DAWN: THE PREHISTORIC

32. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 331–37 (David Fate Norton
& Mary J. Norton eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (1739).
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defined largely by the parties themselves.
Arguably, the greatest virtue of the United States is the
slow but steady trend toward openness and tolerance. The
trend does not skip over marriage law. From coverture to
marital property to no fault divorce to gay marriage and
cohabitation, we see a line of progress far from its finale. Just
as our society has been made more just by the expansion of
the concept of “citizen,” so too will the expansion of the
concept of marriage serve the ends of a just society. This is
so, even if the multi-cultural window is opened to family
forms as objectionable to some as disagreeable speech
protected by the First Amendment, and even if one day
expanded to the point of abolition.
I. POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND CLASSICAL CONTRACT LAW:
GOVERNMENT ROLE IN FAMILY FORMATION
Spanning the tradition of political liberalism from the
seventeenth century until today is the presumption that the
state must sustain the conditions for actualizing the widest
feasible array of conceptions of the good life, ways of being in
the world, and life projects that do not infringe the rights of
others.33 In other words, freedom and reciprocity go hand-inhand. Freedom for one presupposes freedom for all. Rawls,
for instance, theorizes the “reasonable” citizen “ready to
propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation
and to abide by them willingly given the assurance that
others will likewise do so.”34 Political liberalism, then, sees
the State as neutral with regard to the good life and what
people value; as a socio-historical fact, the United States is
so large, complex, and diverse that empirically there can be

33. DÉCLARATION DES DROITS DE L’HOMME ET DU CITOYEN DE 1789 [DECLARATION
RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN OF 1789]; JOHN STUART MILL, THE
SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 8–11 (1869).
OF THE

34. RAWLS, supra note 3, at 49.
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no consensus on these matters.35 The law should not restrict
or unduly burden otherwise private, organic institutional
conduct unless the restricted conduct is harmful or unjust. If
the potential harm is merely speculative, interference is not
warranted, especially where there is a strong countervailing
policy that furthers the good life.
It is likewise a fundamental principle of classical
contract law that individuals should be free to set their own
contact terms and to engage in free exchange of goods and
services, without interference from the government.36 This
rule reflects the belief that individual choice and autonomy
are fundamental to human life, and courts should not impose
upon the parties their own views regarding the value of goods
and services exchanged, as long as the contracting parties
voluntarily and freely assented to such terms.37
Marriage and family formation illustrate the value of the
principles of individual autonomy and State neutrality.
Without neutrality, there is great risk that such a
fundamentally basic organizing principle for living as
household formation would be subordinated to governmental
social and economic interests: dis-incentivizing single
motherhood because of the “drain” on public services or
criminalizing polygamy because of the myth of a “JudeoChristian” foundation to our laws, for instance.
With respect to marriage and intimate relationships,
social experience strongly suggests that people will desire
different and varied types of intimate relationships and
forums for raising their children, or abstain from defined

35. Id. at 36 (stating that “the diversity of reasonable comprehensive
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines found in modern democratic
societies is not a mere historical condition that may soon pass away; it is a
permanent feature of the public culture of democracy”).
36. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981) (claiming that
individual autonomy is a central precondition to individual freedom); MILTON
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962) (claiming that individual autonomy
is seen as a paramount social value).
37. FRIED, supra note 36; FRIEDMAN, supra note 36.
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relationships altogether. In fact, in a pluralistic, open, and
liberal society such as ours, we should expect people to
choose to commit to relationships that many of us find
counterintuitive because human beings are animals with
feelings, not rational wealth-maximizers. Thus, we can
reasonably expect the variety of rich human characteristics
and experiences that critics of plural marriage fear will be
lost due to the specter of resurgent religious control over
family formation. Further, we can reasonably expect some
people to reject the notion that monogamy is always a good
thing.38
Despite the rich variety of human conceptions of the good
life with respect to relationships, the State privileges
monogamous dyads by granting vast economic and legal
benefits to couples that register their relationships with the
State39 (while generally staying neutral regarding other
forms of caring relationships—implicitly devaluing those
other non-privileged relationships). Judicial opinions at all
levels extol the virtues of monogamous matrimony and the
dangers of alternative household formations (often
celebrating marriage in a way that exposes religious
influence), and the State has explicitly regulated and
criminalized polygamy, a type of personal relationship
arrangement that it has deemed to be against public policy. 40
Particularly analyzed as coupled together, by privileging one
form of life while criminalizing another, the State, in the area
of law around marriage, clearly and obviously violates the
principle of neutrality.
In this Section we set out to show the State’s regulation

38. See Isiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118,
169–70 (1970) (explaining that humans choose between ultimate values); RYAN
& JETHÁ, supra note 31, at 5 (2010) (noting that “[t]he frantic sexual hypocrisy in
America is inexplicable if we adhere to traditional models of human sexuality
insisting that monogamy is natural, marriage is a human universal, and any
family structure other than the nuclear is aberrant”).
39. See supra notes 5–14 and accompanying text.
40. See generally infra Section II.A.1.b.
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of marriage arbitrarily restricts conduct by narrowing the
range of legal, feasible, and therefore conceivable family
formations. The key word here is “arbitrary.” Criminal law
seeks to prohibit conduct and narrow the range of human
possibility non-arbitrarily, because to do otherwise would
risk clearly identifiable harms. The State’s justifications for
restricting marriage to dyads are arbitrary in that “the
stable family” masks residual puritanism, and “the best
interests of children” masks the intent to rationalize heteronormativity, as it was during the “gay marriage debate.” In
each case, appeals to social prejudices with ostensibly
neutral language are the means by which democratic
processes favor one way of life over another.
Section A surveys the long history of State interference
with private relationships through a vast array of laws and
regulations providing economic and legal benefits to those
who marry, and criminalizing marriage among more than
two people. Section A then looks at current trends
surrounding marriage, highlighting the existing illusion of
liberal progress. Although there is no longer coverture and
there are no longer marital rape exemptions, problems such
as domestic violence and gendered marital roles remain. This
Section then explains why such State interference is
unjustified and sets out the need for State neutrality. The
overarching themes here are the State’s unjustified narrow
conception of marriage and its intrusion into personal,
intimate relations.
Section B proposes the idea of marriage as a private
institution, which would grant participants autonomy to
make individual choices based on their unique individual
needs and desires. In this Section we ultimately set out to
show why the various other unprivileged intimate
relationships, such as polygamy and polyamory, are not
inherently harmful, and should be offered as meaningful
alternatives to traditional two-person monogamous
marriage. Here, the overarching themes are, as opposed to
unjustified essentialism and intrusion, a justified approach
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based on established contract law principles and an openness
to forms of life.
A. Marriage in the Liberal State
The State has a long history of regulating marriage in
order to promote its financial interests and an equally long
history in prohibiting polygamy in order to promote sexual
behavioral norms and the “best interests” of women and
children. The State endorses one form among feasible
alternative matrimonial ideals, advancing “matrimony as an
ideal type of personal relationship.”41 By promoting civil
marriage, the State endorses one conception of the good life,
advancing the view that civil marriage gives meaning and
value to life and is superior to other types of relationships. In
doing so, the State “ignores alternative ideals of
relationship[:] . . . close dyadic friendships, small group
family units, or networks of multiple, significant
nonexclusive relationships that provide emotional support,
caretaking, and intimacy,”42 not to mention living singly. The
prevailing legal approach is unjustified in confusing the
parochial for the universal and violating the principle of
neutrality. It is also exclusive in that marital terms accord to
a particular image of the good life and deny formal
recognition to feasible alternative arrangements.
1. Illiberal History of State Interference in Marriage and
Preference for Monogamy
a. Marriage
A genealogical approach to understanding marriage’s
role in society opens a window to a clearer view of how social
norms and public policy have restricted feasible alternative
family forms and trapped individuals into a single,
normatively idealized form of life. Some of these same
41. Cabulea May, supra note 19, at 9.
42. BRAKE, supra note 19, at 168. See supra notes 5–14 and accompanying
text.
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individuals, under a more open legal regime, may have lived
differently—an injustice of no small measure. The injustice
is magnified when considering the injustices historically
associated with the State-sanctioned monopolistic
monogamous marriage.
Historically, patriarchy has used marriage to deny
women liberally conceived rights and personhood with
reference to men, or rather “public society.”43 A free woman’s
legal rights depended on her marital status;44 single women
had more rights than married women at common law.45 As
long as a woman remained unmarried she could enter into
contracts, buy and sell real estate, and accumulate personal
property, which included cash, stocks, and livestock.46 An
unmarried woman could also sue or be sued, write wills, and
act as an executor of an estate.47 Under the common law
system of coverture, once married, a woman lost her
autonomy and was subsumed under her husband’s
identity.48 The husband acquired an estate in the wife’s real
property for the duration of the marriage and he was entitled
to sole possession and control of any property that the wife
owned.49
At common law the husband also enjoyed substantial
43. Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Lesbians and Gay Men Should Read Martha
Fineman, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 167, 170 (1999).
44. Enslaved black women were not allowed to marry, have custody of
children, own property, control their bodies, or earn money from their labor.
Darlene C. Goring, The History of Slave Marriage in the United States, 39 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 299, 307–11 (2006).
45. Yvette Joy Liebesman, No Guarantees: Lessons from the Property Rights
Gained and Lost by Married Women in Two American Colonies, 27 WOMEN’S RTS.
L. REP. 181, 183–87 (2006).
46. Id. at 183–84.
47. Id. at 183.
48. Norma Basch, Invisible Women: The Legal Fiction of Marital Unity in
Nineteenth-Century America, 5 FEMINIST STUD. 346, 347 (1979). See also Bradwell
v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141–42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
49. Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal
Construction of the Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641, 1661 (2003).
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rights over the body of his wife. Husbands were allowed to
punish their wives physically as long as the corporal
punishment did not cause permanent injury.50 Husbands
were also legally permitted to restrict their wives’
movements; rape their wives; physically restrain wives from
leaving the household; force them to come back to the
household if they left; and conclusively determine where the
couple would reside.51
Until the late twentieth century, marital rape exemption
laws—laws that allowed husbands to brutally rape their
wives without fear of prosecution52—existed under the
statutory law of every state and the common law.53 These
laws were justified by the idea that there was a “marital
right” to sexual intercourse that wives irrevocably consented
to upon marriage.54 Further, since wives were considered the
property of their husbands and since their identities merged
upon marriage, rape was impossible—at best it was a crime
against the husband’s property interest.55 The State was
thought to have no right to legislate the private relationships
between husband and wife.56 Furthermore, for the majority
of our country’s history, “a husband’s use of physical violence
to exert power and control over his wife was not
conceptualized as domestic violence.”57 In fact, “[before]
1970, the term ‘domestic violence’ referred to ghetto riots and
urban terrorism, not the abuse of women by their intimate
50. Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape,
88 CALIF. L. REV. 1373, 1389 (2000).
51. Id. at 1390–92.
52. Jessica Klarfeld, A Striking Disconnect: Marital Rape Law’s Failure to
Keep Up with Domestic Violence Law, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1819, 1825 (2011).
53. See id. at 1819.
54. Id. at 1825.
55. Id. at 1826.
56. Id. at 1826–27.
57. Emily J. Sack, From the Right of Chastisement to the Criminalization of
Domestic Violence: A Study in Resistance to Effective Policy Reform, 32 T.
JEFFERSON L. REV. 31, 32 (2009).
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partners.”58 Many of the same beliefs that supported the
justification for marital rape exemption laws also justified a
husband’s entitlement “to correct [his wife’s] behavior as he
would that of a servant or child.”59
The history of marriage before the latter part of the
twentieth century is an important factor in the evaluation of
claims that in virtue of polygamy or co-habitation, or
polyamorous unions, patriarchy will reign. Feminism,
secularization, and the trend toward tolerance mitigated the
harsh effects of monogamous marriage, as it will other
arrangements, including polygamy, insofar as people will
voluntarily choose it.
b. The Monogamy Monopoly
The State has demonstrated an unfair preference for
monogamy, one feasible form of life among others. As an
example, consider the history of the law of polygamy. The
history of State animus toward and criminalization of
polygamy is also long. Polygamy is one of six important
historical bars to civil marriage in the United States: (1)
during the period of slavery in the United States, marriage
between slaves, though informally celebrated, was not
legally recognized; (2) historically marriage across racial
lines was barred; (3) until recently, same-sex marriage was
not legally recognized; (4) incest or family marriage is barred
in every state in some form;60 (5) marriage of minors is not
recognized; and (6) polygamous marriages are not legal. 61 Of
those, incest, age, and polygamy are the only bars to

58. Kit Kinports, So Much Activity, So Little Change: A Reply to the Critics of
Battered Women’s Self-Defense, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 155, 155 (2004)
(citing Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts:
Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1285, 1290 n.42
(2000)).
59. Sack, supra note 57, at 33.
60. Harvard Law Review Association, Inbred Obscurity: Improving Incest
Laws in the Shadow of the “Sexual Family,” 119 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2465 (2006).
61. Calhoun, supra note 24, at 1024.
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marriage that remain.62
In response to the Mormon practice of plural marriage in
the Utah Territory,63 the federal government first began to
regulate polygamous marriage in 1862, with the Morrill
Anti-Bigamy Act of 1862,64 making bigamy (defined as “when
a person with a living husband or wife marries another
person”65) a federal offense. The Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act,
however, did little to curtail bigamy, since “Mormon juries
refused to convict their peers.”66 Even so, anti-polygamy
sentiment in the rest of the country was high, and the federal
government persisted in making life difficult for polygamists.
This continued attention paid to anti-polygamy efforts by the
federal government ultimately resulted in a legal challenge
to the law by Mormon leaders.
In 1878, in Reynolds v. United States,67 the Supreme
Court held that polygamy was not protected under the Free

62. We justify permitting polygamous marriage while rejecting incestuous
matrimony and marriage of minors based on the proven identifiable harms to
incestuously born children and the emotional and intellectual incapacity of
minors. However, our proposal embraces sibling partnerships and intergenerational households and does not rule out arrangements between siblings
and cousins not intended to result in parenthood. The precise solution to the age
and incest issues is beyond the scope of this paper’s broad proposal for a
paradigmatic shift in the law.
63. Though the primary targets of American polygamy laws have been
Mormon populations, some Native Americans communities also engage in the
practice of polygamy, but their tribal marriage practices supersede state law. See
Hallowell v. Commons, 210 F. 793, 800 (8th Cir. 1914) (holding that “a different
rule prevails with reference to the marriages of Indians, who are members of a
tribe recognized and treated with as such by the United States government; for
it has always been the policy of the general government to permit the Indian
tribes as such to regulate their own domestic affairs, and to -control the
intercourse between the sexes by their own customs and usages,” even if in
conflict with state law).
64. Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act, ch. 126, 12 Stat. 501 (1862).
65. Ashley E. Morin, Use It or Lose It: The Enforcement of Polygamy Laws in
America, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 497, 502 (2014).
66. Id.
67. 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
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Exercise Clause,68 explaining that “[l]aws are made for the
government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with
mere religious beliefs and opinions, they may with practices.”
The Reynolds decision “galvanized the anti-polygamy
movement further,” causing “reformers of all kinds—
women’s rights advocates, educators, church leaders,
politicians, presidential platforms, state legislatures, the
Supreme Court, and the American Congress—[to] harshly
condemn[] polygamy.”69 In 1882, Congress passed the
Edmunds Anti-Polygamy Act,70 which reinforced the Morrill
Anti-Bigamy Act by adding several provisions to help enforce
polygamy prohibition. The Edmunds Anti-Polygamy Act
prohibited bigamous cohabitation, thus removing the need to
prove that actual marriages had occurred.71 The Act also
stated that anyone who believed in bigamy was unfit to serve
as a juror or hold public office.72 These additions ultimately
increased the number of indictments.73
After these crackdowns on polygamy, “Mormons
continued to fight federal laws aimed at curtailing polygamy,
but they were largely unsuccessful.”74 Ultimately, in 1890, in
The Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter
Day Saints v. United States,75 the Supreme Court upheld the
Edmunds Anti-Polygamy Act and disincorporated the Latter
Day Saints (LDS) Church. At this point, the Mormon Church
appeared to reject polygamy, but many Mormons continued
to practice it. But when the Church threatened to
excommunicate polygamists in the 1930s, the “vast majority”

68. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
69. Morin, supra note 65, at 503–04 (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
70. Edmunds Anti-Polygamy Act of 1882, Pub L. No. 47-47, 22 Stat. 30 (1882).
71. See id.
72. Id.
73. Morin, supra note 65, at 504.
74. Id.
75. 136 U.S. 1, 64–66 (1890).
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of Mormons finally abandoned the practice.76 There
remained, however, a small group of Mormons who
continued to practice polygamy. These fundamentalists “do
not believe the Church of Latter-day Saints had the
authority to issue a manifesto in 1890 banning plural
unions” and that “if an ‘eternal principle’ was valid at one
time it was valid for all times.”77 Accordingly, these
fundamentalist communities continue today to practice
polygamy, as a “fundamental tenet of the Mormon faith.”78
Today, although polygamy remains illegal in all fifty
states, laws proscribing polygamy are rarely enforced—other
than the prosecution of a few infamous fundamentalist
leaders.79 The lack of rigid enforcement does not discount the
fact that the history of the criminalization of polygamy has
influenced public opinion; state criminalization statutes
remain popular. Polygamy has been widely viewed as

76. The LDS Church has asserted that it has no interest in reinstituting the
practice of polygamy, having recently conceded in a brief to the United States
Supreme Court that “[t]he question of plural marriage, of course, was addressed
in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).” Brief of The Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at n.11,
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (No. 95-2074). In that brief, the LDS
church reiterated that “[t]he practice of plural marriage was abandoned by the
Church in 1890, and in filing this amicus brief the Church has no interest in
revisiting this issue,” and explained that stories about Mormon polygamy in the
media were generally about “splinter groups” that had left the church. Id.
77. Morin, supra note 65, at 504.
78. Id.
79. The lack of law enforcement raises questions about the criminal status of
the practice:
[b]y disregarding and selectively enforcing polygamy laws, state
governments are failing to advance the purported protective goals of
polygamy legislation and negating the purpose of the laws, while
also restraining law-abiding citizens from entering into the practice.[]
Thus, the current state of polygamy legislation operates in an illogical
middle ground and undermines the legitimacy of the criminal justice
system.
Morin, supra note 65, at 500–01. There is an argument to be made that in light
of the lack of enforcement, polygamous relationships should be decriminalized, if
only to legitimize the criminal justice system. Id.
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morally inferior by a majority of the world:
Most Americans still view polygamy as something nefarious, much
like slavery, its “twin.” In a Gallup Poll taken in May 2003, just one
month prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas,
overturning that state’s ban on same-sex sodomy, ninety-two
percent of adults surveyed nationwide considered “polygamy, when
one husband has more than one wife at the same time” —or, more
precisely, polygyny—to be “morally wrong.”80

Despite ever-increasing divorce rates, monogamous
marriage is “the preferred—even legally and socially
mandated—marital lifestyle in so much of the modern
world[.]”81 Monogamous marriage was initially and
historically based primarily on economic conditions,82
meeting financial needs of couples (and women in particular)
and meeting the parenting needs of families. Monogamy is
also thought to reduce male reproductive competition and
suppress intra-sexual competition among men for brides,
which shrinks the size of the pool of low-status, risk-oriented,
unmarried men.83 The result is lower rates of crime
(including rape, murder, assault, and robbery) and personal
abuse.84 On the flip side, there is thought to be “greater
parental investment (especially male), economic productivity
([GDP per capita]), and female equality.”85 By increasing the
relatedness within the household, monogamy may also
reduce intra-household conflict, leading to lower rates of

80. Shayna M. Sigman, Everything Lawyers Know About Polygamy is Wrong,
16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 104 (2006) (internal citations omitted).
81. DAVID P. BARASH, OUT OF EDEN 109 (2016).
82. Id. at 121.
83. Joseph Henrich et al., The Puzzle of Monogamous Marriage, 367 ROYAL
SOCIETY PUBL’G 657, 658 (2012). See also DAVID M. BUSS, THE HANDBOOK OF
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 427–439 (2d ed. 2015); June Carbone,
Understanding the Biological Basis of Commitment: Does One Size Fit All?, 25
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 179, 181 (2004); Patrick Coleman, Blame Monogamy for
Male Infertility, FATHERLY (Apr. 19, 2017, 10:53 AM), https://www.
fatherly.com/health-science/blame-monogamy-for -male-infertility/.
84. Henrich, supra note 83, at 658.
85. Id.
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child neglect, accidental death, and homicide. 86
While monogamous marriage is often idealized, the
undeniable religiously-grounded history frequently appealed
to by courts,87 legislatures,88 and executives,89 contributes to
the current framing of monogamy as valuable for its own
sake, independent of context and the participants. For
example, Christian values promote sexual fidelity, lifelong
marriage, and parenthood, and the belief that cohabitation,
premarital sex, divorce, unwed motherhood, and abortion are
immoral behaviors is fundamental to many Western
religions.90
It is not unusual for politicians to invoke God in their
defense of traditional monogamous marriage. In 2006, for
example, Mike Pence, as head of the Republican Study
Committee, supported a constitutional amendment that
would have defined marriage as between a man and a woman
and stated that “societal collapse was always brought about
following an advent of the deterioration of marriage and
family.”91 He went on to say that keeping gay people from
marrying was not discrimination, “but an enforcement of
‘God’s idea.’”92 Mike Huckabee, the 44th Governor of

86. Id. at 657.
87. See infra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.
88. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., Dave Miller, The Sacredness of Marriage, APOLOGETICS PRESS,
https://www.apologeticspress.org/apcontent.aspx?category=7&article=1237 (last
visited May 21, 2017) (arguing that “the breakdown of the traditional two-parent,
biological husband-wife family is a major factor contributing to the overall moral,
religious, and ethical decline of our country”); see also Daniel B. Gallagher, The
Sacredness of Marriage: A Lesson from the Pagans, CRISIS MAGAZINE (Mar. 1,
2016),
http://www.crisismagazine.com/2016/the-sacredness-of-marriage-alesson-from-the-pagans (putting forward the idea that “marriage between a man
and a woman, and indeed monogamy itself, are contained in the natural law”).
91. Will Drabold, Here’s What Mike Pence Said on LGBT Issues Over the
Years, TIME (Jul. 15, 2016) http://time.com/4406337/mike-pence-gay-rights-lgbtreligious-freedom/.
92. Id.
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Arkansas, stated that “[f]or me… [marriage equality] is not
just a political issue. It is a biblical issue.”93 Randy Weber, a
United States congressman from Texas, even wept at a
prayer event in Washington, D.C. as he begged God to forgive
the United States for legalizing same-sex marriage. He
exclaimed, “[f]ather, we’ve trampled on your holy institution
of holy matrimony and tried to rewrite what it is and we’ve
called it an alternate lifestyle. . . father, oh father, please
forgive us.”94
Legislatures also invoke God to justify their polygamy
legislation. The Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act,95 The Edmunds
Anti-Polygamy Act,96 and the Edmunds-Tucker Act of 188797
all have religious foundations. For example, the legislative
history of the Edmunds Tucker Act includes President
Grover Cleveland’s emotional discussion of the issue of
polygamy:
The Strength, the perpetuity, and the destiny of the nation rest
upon our homes, established by the law of God, guarded by parental
care, regulated by parental authority, and sanctified by parental
love. These are not homes of polygamy. The mothers of our land,
who rule the nation as they mold the characters and guide the
actions of their sons, live according to God’s holy ordinances, and
each, secure and happy in the exclusive love of the father of her
children, sheds the warm light of true womanhood, unperverted and
unpolluted, upon all within her pure and wholesome family circle.
These are not the cheerless, crushed, and unwomanly mothers of
polygamy. . . . There is no feature of this practice or the system
which sanctions it which is not opposed to all that is of value in our

93. Bethany Grace Howe, If Not God’s Authority, Whose? Where Did Marriage
Come From, HUFFINGTON POST (Sep. 5, 2015, 10:12 AM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/raina-bowe/if-not-gods-authority-who_b_8090588.html.
94. Curtis M. Wong, GOP Congressman Wept as He Begged God to Forgive
U.S. for Marriage Equality, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 28, 2017, 2:39 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/randy-weber-marriage-equality_us_59023
d75e4b05c39767d0722.
95. Pub. L. No. 37-126, 12 Stat. 501 (1862).
96. Pub. L. No. 47-47, 22 Stat. 30 (1882).
97. Pub. L. No. 49- 397, 24 Stat. 635 (1887).
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institutions.98

Pervasive views of monogamous, two-person marriage as
“noble” and “sacred” can also be seen in most of the United
States Supreme Court’s notable marriage cases. For
instance, the 1888 United States Supreme Court called
monogamous marriage “the most important relation in life”
and “the foundation of the family and of society, without
which there would be neither civilization nor progress.”99 In
the mid-twentieth century, the Court opined that marriage
is:
a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is
an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.100

Most recently, the 2015 Court, granting same-sex
couples the right to marry, reasoned, “[t]he nature of
marriage is that, through its enduring bond, two persons
together can find other freedoms, such as expression,
intimacy, and spirituality.”101 The Court opined:
From their beginning to their most recent page, the annals of
human history reveal the transcendent importance of marriage. The
lifelong union of a man and a woman always has promised nobility
and dignity to all persons, without regard to their station in life.
Marriage is sacred to those who live by their religions and offers
unique fulfillment to those who find meaning in the secular realm.
Its dynamic allows two people to find a life that could not be found
alone, for a marriage becomes greater than just the two persons.
Rising from the most basic human needs, marriage is essential to
our most profound hopes and aspirations.102

The Obergefell Court’s rhetoric about the sacredness of
98. 17 CONG. REC. 109, 119 (1886).
99. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888).
100. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
101. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015).
102. Id. at 2593–94.
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marriage is high oratory hewing a huge hypocrisy,
considering that this same sovereign body would quickly
uphold criminal sanctions against Hillary’s decision to accept
Sappho’s wish to be a “sister-wife” or prosecute anti-bigamy
laws against Steve for intending to formalize his tantric trio
with Gautauma and Bob. 103 Such rhetoric is especially
hypocritical in that the unions this Court would not sanction
simply seek fulfillment outside of the so-called “unique
fulfillment” offered by a particular, though historicallyrooted, conception of the good life and right way to live.
The particular conception of the good life and right way
to live favored by the State parallels historical social
prejudices. While marriage is seen as sacred, intimate
relationships not culminating in marriage have historically
been seen as “illicit”104 or “meretricious,”105 with participants
thought to be “living in sin.” This phrase, popularly
associated with the attitude of the church, arises from the
outdated idea that legal marriage is a prerequisite for
conjugal relationships—and that conjugal relationships
103. See supra introductory vignette.
104. Illicit cohabitation is “an offense committed by an unmarried man and
woman who live together as husband and wife and engage in sexual intercourse.”
Illicit
Cohabitation
Law
and
Legal
Definition,
USLEGAL,
https://definitions.uslegal.com/i/illicit-cohabitation/ (last visited July 8, 2018).
Though this offense does not exist in most states any more, and where it does, it
is rarely prosecuted, the term is still sometimes used to refer to a couple who are
not married to one another but “live together in circumstances that make the
arrangement questionable on grounds of social propriety.” Id. Illicit cohabitation
is still sometimes a crime “when [it] amounts to public immorality and public
scandal.” Id.
105. A meretricious relationship is generally defined as a cohabitation that is
marital in nature but not on paper. Meretricious relationship, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). When a former spouse and new partner live together
without getting married, for example, their relationship is meretricious, and can
affect the former spouse’s legal rights with respect to alimony and child support.
Generally, such a term has been used negatively to indicate a former spouse is
“living in sin.” Courts have historically disfavored private contractual
alternatives to marriage, finding them contrary to public policy. 2 HOWARD O.
HUNTER & KEITH A. ROWLEY, Cases Rejecting Marvin Approach, in MODERN LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 24:8 (rev. ed. 2011) (citing Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill.
1979)).
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outside of marriage are sinful. For just one example, Got
Questions Ministries, a Christian website that answers Bible
questions, answered the question about whether living
together before marriage is considered living in sin in this
way:
Since the only form of lawful sexuality is the marriage of one man
and one woman (Genesis 2:24; Matthew 19:5), then anything
outside of marriage, whether it is adultery, premarital sex,
homosexuality, or anything else, is unlawful, in other words, sin.
Living together before marriage definitely falls into the category of
fornication—sexual sin.106

The religious framing of marriage unduly influences
judicial policy outside of polygamy as well. For example,
meretricious agreements, or private agreements governing
non-marital sexual relationships, are still viewed by some
courts as against public policy.107 Particularly where the
parties to a contract are a gay or lesbian couple, or an
unmarried, cohabitating heterosexual couple, moral and
social judgments about sexuality and loose sexual behavior
can influence the court’s analysis of the contractual issue at
hand. Similarly, most courts do not view meretricious
relationships the same way as marriage when it comes to the
distribution of marital property. In Washington State, for
example, laws involving distribution of marital property do
not apply directly to division of property following a
meretricious relationship (though courts may look to these
laws for guidance).108
Not surprisingly, then, adultery, which violates the
106. Why is living together before marriage considered living in sin?, GOT
QUESTIONS, https://www.gotquestions.org/living-in-sin.html (last visited July 8,
2018).
107. Though post-Marvin contracts between cohabitants are now often
enforceable, Elizabeth Hodges, Comment, Will You “Contractually” Marry Me?,
23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 385, 391–92 (2010), there are still some states
that refuse to enforce them. See, e.g., Long v. Marino, 441 S.E.2d 475, 476 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1994); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (Ill. 1979); Schwegmann
v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316, 326 (La. Ct. App. 1983)).
108. Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 836 (Wash. 1995).
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sacred bonds of marriage, is still a criminal act in twenty-one
states (although rarely enforced),109 and still very much
considered a sin by many. The criminalization of certain
types of sexual activity within a marriage is a vestige of the
historical view that adultery is not simply “a breach of the
nuptial vow” but rather “a crime against society”:
It is the destruction of all domestic confidence; the alienation of the
affections of the wife from the husband; and the withdrawal of the
protection and support of the father, from the child. It is the
confusion of the issue, the corruption of the blood, casting upon a
man the insufferable imposition of compelling him to maintain by
his name, and with his property, as his own heir, the child of his
worst enemy, which eminently distinguishes the crime of adultery
from that of fornication. The true distinction between adultery and
fornication, will be found to consist in this. That whenever the issue
which may arise from the illicit intercourse, will be Legitimate, it is
adultery: but on the contrary, if the issue will be a Bastard, it is
fornication.110

Courts frequently base their judgments on this moral
denunciation. For example, in 1981, a state appellate court
in Louisiana upheld a verdict that found a mother “morally
unfit” to have custody of her young daughter because the
mother, while married, engaged in a course of open and
public adultery in disregard of generally accepted moral
principles.111 Courts also consider adultery as marital fault
weighing against the adulterer when determining equitable
distribution. For example, in 2011, an appellate court in
Mississippi upheld a trial court’s verdict that awarded the
husband ninety percent of marital property after “weigh[ing]
[the wife’s adultery] heavily against [her].”112 The use of

109. Deborah L. Rhode, Why is Adultery Still a Crime?, L.A. TIMES (May 2,
2016,
5:00
AM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-rhodedecriminalize-adultery-20160429-story.html.
110. State v. Lash, 16 N.J.L. 380, 383 (1838). In 1840, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin, prosecuted Hugh R. Hunter for violating an adultery statute, and
stated that, “adultery is the sin of incontinence between persons, one or both of
whom are married.” Hunter v. United States, Bur. 171 (Wis. 1840).
111. Bonner v. Bonner, 408 So. 2d 995, 998 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
112. Bond v. Bond, 2010-CA-00637-COA, 69 So. 3d 771, 772–73 (Miss. Ct. App.
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adultery as marital fault extends to alimony as well. In 2014,
an appellate court in South Carolina found that a trial court
acted within its discretion when it denied alimony to a wife
because her husband presented sufficient corroborating
testimony to demonstrate that she had committed
adultery.113
Another way courts hand down moral judgment about
non-marital relationships is through the preferential
economic treatment of married couples referred to in Section
I.A.1.a above.114 Most of the government-provided legal
benefits offered to married couples have not been afforded to
those in meretricious relationships. For example, after
Michigan stopped recognizing any common-law marriage
contracted after January 1, 1957, property rights afforded to
a legally married couple have not been extended to those
engaged in meretricious relationships.115
Based on these historical and traditional views, the
State’s ostensible justification for the criminalization of
polygamy as necessary to uphold and protect the sacred
institution of marriage is nearer the “idealized normative
ideal” of theocracy, than to liberal democracy. For example,
as early as 1890, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he state
has a perfect right to prohibit polygamy, and all other open
offenses against the enlightened sentiment of mankind,
notwithstanding the pretence of religious conviction by
which they may be advocated and practiced.”116 Later, in
Reynolds, the Court justified its holding criminalizing
polygamy by noting that marriage by its nature is “a sacred
obligation,”117 and that polygamy has always been “an
2011).
113. Mick-Skaggs v. Skaggs, 766 S.E.2d 870, 874 (S.C. Ct. App. 2014).
114. See supra notes 43–49 and accompanying text.
115. Carnes v. Sheldon, 311 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
116. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1, 50 (1890).
117. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878). The Reynolds Court
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offence against society.”118 Here, the offense against society
is still functionally a supposed offense against “the sacred”
with no identifiable harm—the paradigmatic theocratic
reasoning:
Upon [marriage] society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits
spring social relations and social obligations and duties, with which
government is necessarily required to deal. In fact, according as
monogamous or polygamous marriages are allowed, do we find the
principles on which the government of the people, to a greater or
less extent, rests.119

The Maynard Court similarly used language relating to
the sanctity of marriage to justify its decision to criminalize
polygamy. The Court noted:
Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having
more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any
other institution, has always been subject to the control of the
legislature. . . . It is an institution, in the maintenance of which in
its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of
the family and of society, without which there would be neither
civilization nor progress.120

Fallacy results when monogamy in its modern form is
compared to polygamy’s dominant historical form.
Historically,
polygamous
relationships
have
been
characterized by exploitation and oppression of women. The
practice of polygamy often coincides with crimes targeting
noted:
From that day to this we think it may safely be said there never has been
a time in any State of the Union when polygamy has not been an offence
against society, cognizable by the civil courts and punishable with more
or less severity. In the face of all this evidence, it is impossible to believe
that the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom was intended to
prohibit legislation in respect to this most important feature of social
life. Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred obligation, is
nevertheless, in most civilized nations, a civil contract, and usually
regulated by law.
Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888).
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women and children, such as incest, sexual assault, statutory
rape, and failure to pay child support. 121 Evidence from
Africa and the Middle East indicates higher rates of domestic
violence in polygamous marriages, including sexual abuse. 122
Likely as a result, women in polygynous unions are at risk of
increased mental health problems, and children in
polygynous unions fare worse than their counterparts in
monogamous marriages in a variety of ways, including
higher death rates.123 Polygamy in the United States also has
a long history of misogyny and extremely oppressive
patriarchy, as well as a history of statutory rape.124
But the reality is that both monogamy and polygamy
were historically designed to serve the needs of men and as
a tool used to enslave women. Both forms of family formation
have oppressed millions of women around the world, creating
psychologically and physically damaging relationships. The
pervasive problem of oppression of women in both types of
family formations indicates that the cause is not limited to
just one of the forms of family. A new, modern contract model
is warranted and overdue.
2. Current Trends
a. Marriage
Today, many of the historical problems with the
institution of marriage remain, although in modified form.
Marriage still disadvantages women in many ways,
including by the continued prevalence of domestic violence.

121. See generally Vazquez, supra note 25, at 239–45.
122. See generally Rose McDermott, Expert REPORT PREPARED FOR THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA, VANCOUVER REGISTRY NO. S-097767, 5, https://
stoppolygamyincanada.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/mcdermott-report.pdf.
123. See generally id.
124. See, e.g., State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, 137 P.3d 726, 752 (Utah 2006)
(upholding the conviction of a man on charges of bigamy and sexual contact with
a minor when he married a 16-year-old girl in a religious ceremony).

2018]

FROM MARRIAGE TO HOUSEHOLDS

941

Women continue to do worse in the employment market, 125
which increases their dependence on their spouse, which in
turn weakens their autonomy and perpetuates the
subordination of women in a marriage. It is widely thought
that marriage continues to be “a central instrument in the
denial of women’s status as full citizens.”126
Despite great advances in the legal treatment of
domestic violence,127 statistics show that domestic violence
against the woman remains widespread in our society,128 and
“[c]ommunity-based research indicates that almost one out
of every four married women will be struck by their
husbands at some time during their marriage.”129 The
American criminal justice system still tends to be reluctant
to interfere in private family life,130 based on the historical
view that “the preservation of marital privacy and domestic
harmony require[s] that the law stay out of the relationship
125. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NEWS RELEASE USDL-18-1240, THE EMPLOYMENT
SITUATION—JULY 2018, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf.
126. Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. REV. 573, 619–20 n.210
(2013) (internal citation omitted).
127. In the mid-1970s, state legislatures and courts finally began to realize
that there was no place for marital rape exemptions in “modern American law
and society.” Klarfeld, supra note 52, at 1819 (quoting People v. M.D., 595 N.E.2d
702, 711 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)). During this period, marital rape exemption laws
began to dissolve. Id. at 1826; Sack, supra note 57, at 35. In fact by 1993, all fifty
states and the District of Columbia recognized marital rape as a crime. Klarfeld,
supra note 52, at 1819. This “profound shift in domestic violence policy” led
Congress to pass the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (42 U.S.C. § 13701
(2012)), which was “the first comprehensive federal response to the problem of
domestic violence.” Kinports, supra note 58, at 156 (footnote omitted); Sack,
supra note 57, at 36 (footnote omitted).
128. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the
Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11 (1991); see also I Married a Monster:
The Horrors of Domestic Violence, 51 R.I.B.J. 29, 30 (2003) (noting that “[v]iolence
is a common occurrence in ten (10%) to twenty-five (25%) per cent of all marriages
in the United States and cuts across all racial, age and economic lines” (citing
TAMARA L. ROLEFF, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 16–17 (2000))).
129. Sana Loue, Intimate Partner Violence Bridging the Gap Between Law and
Science, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 1 (2000).
130. Dan Markel, Jennifer M. Collins & Ethan J. Leib, Criminal Justice and
the Challenge of Family Ties, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1147, 1192 (2007).
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between husband and wife.”131 The way the criminal justice
system treats sex offenses committed within marriages is
one example of the “long-lasting” marks the historical nature
of marriage has left.132
Another residual effect of coverture prevailing today is
the presumption that a married couple’s division of labor
should be gendered pursuant to each spouse’s “natural role.”
Women still “fare more poorly in the employment market and
thus are more dependent on their spouses,”133 and women
are particularly burdened at home due to the division of
labor. According to De Beauvoir, a woman’s work within the
home does not provide her with any autonomy. She is not
useful to the wider society; her work is seen as being mere
maintenance. A woman’s work is only given meaning
through her husband and children—”she is justified through
them; but in their lives she is only an inessential
intermediary.”134 Despite the fact that her obedience is no
longer a legal obligation, this does not change the way that
she is perceived in society. It is very difficult for a woman
(wife) to gain recognition for her work, to be “respected as a
complete person.” However respected a woman is, she is still
regarded as “subordinate, secondary, parasitic.”135
While women’s expected labor within the marital
relation is left wanting for excitement, so is the romance. In
Western countries, almost all of which have forbidden
polygamy, adultery is rampant. Indeed, according to the
General Social Survey, the rate of infidelity has been pretty
constant at around twenty-one percent for married men, and

131. See Klarfeld, supra note 52, at 1826; Sack, supra note 57, at 33–34.
132. See Candice A. Garcia-Rodrigo, An Analysis of and Alternative to the
Radical Feminist Position on the Institution of Marriage, 11 J.L. & FAM. STUD.
113, 117 (2008).
133. Aloni, supra note 126, at 620.
134. See SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 510 (H. M. Parshley ed. &
trans., First Vintage Books 1974) (1949).
135. See id. at 501.
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between ten to fifteen percent for married women.136 Overall,
fewer and fewer individuals and couples are choosing to
marry,137 and those who do are divorcing at alarming
rates.138 The monogamous, state-sponsored marriage policy
is unsuccessful according to its own terms.
Despite the shocking historical practice of marriage and
the continued suppression of women in the lingering shadow
of coverture, the State still promotes marriage as the
idealized form of personal relationship. The State’s interest
in marriage is apparent from the benefits granted to married
people. There are approximately 1,049 federal laws in the
United States Code that consider marital status as a factor 139
and the vast majority of those laws provide economic benefits
for the married couple. For example, the tax code provides
tax breaks to married couples,140 the bankruptcy code allows
for a favorable choice of different filing options for married
couples,141 and surviving spouses of a marriage receive a

136. Richard A. Friedman, Infidelity Lurks in Your Genes, N.Y. TIMES (May 22,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/24/opinion/sunday/infidelity-lurks-inyour-genes.html.
137. See Deborah Zalesne, The Contractual Family: The Role of the Market in
Shaping Family Formations and Rights, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1027, 1034, 1038
(2015).
138. The conventional wisdom is that half of all marriages end in divorce. See
William J. Doherty & Leah Ward Sears, Delaying Divorce to Save Marriages,
WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/delayingdivorce-to-save-marriages/2011/10/19/gIQAKh0f1L_story.html?utm_term=.76c5
66eff427.
139. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., GAO/OGC-97-16, DEFENSE
ACT, 4 (1997).

OF

MARRIAGE

140. There are fifty-nine provisions in the Federal Income Tax Code under
which tax liability depends on marital status. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF.,
GAO/GGD-96-175, TAX ADMINISTRATION: INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF MARRIED
AND SINGLE INDIVIDUALS, 3 (1996). When a married couple’s incomes have large
disparities, they often receive a tax bonus because the spouse with the higher
income will pay less in taxes by filing jointly then he or she would have filing as
a single person. Id. The tax treatment appears to preference traditional notions
of marriage where a partnership is formed between a wage earner and a
homemaker.
141. Under the bankruptcy code, a husband and wife can opt to file for
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number of “death benefits,” such as social security.142 Indeed,
“the entire federal tax scheme fosters and subsidizes the
economics of marriage.”143 As a result, “those who do not
participate in the ‘economic partnership’ of matrimony may
suffer financially.”144 For instance, one of the authors would
save thousands of dollars a year on health insurance costs
but-for being a co-habitant rather than a legal spouse.
For the most part, the historical and current emphasis
on marriage has trumped or limited private decision-making
in these areas because the state treats the marital unit as a
fundamental part of policy-making in a way that excludes
other increasingly common family forms. Indeed,
historically, the law has treated non-married partners as
strangers or third parties.145 Setting economic benefits
within the construct of marriage elevates the status of
marriage and herds couples into a state-designed and
bankruptcy jointly. 11 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). Since couples are often jointly liable
for debts and own property jointly, the statute facilitates the consolidation of the
estates, which reduces administration costs and only requires one filing fee. Even
though they are filing jointly, the statute allows each party to claim federal
exemptions as if they were filing separately, although some states have opted out
of this. Id. § 522(m).
142. Once a couple meets the marriage requirements, a surviving spouse has
access to survivors’ insurance benefits and have more options in how they receive
retirement benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 416(c) (2012). Spouses can elect to take [their]
own benefits, or instead take 50% of a spouse’s benefit. As in tax treatment, this
would not benefit equal wage earners but in beneficial for marital couples with
disparate wages.
143. Robson, supra note 17, at 786. However, tax policy benefits married
couples with disparate incomes and “penalizes” married couples with similar
incomes, functioning as state perpetuation of the historical trend in the West of
the husband in the “public sphere” and the wife in the “private.” Taxes: Who Gets
a Marriage Bonus and Who a Penalty, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 9, 2014, 10:30 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/video/taxes-who-gets-a-marriage-bonus-and-who-apenalty/13172E38-C73B-49F4-9EF8-9357FC6CB6F1.html.
144. Robson, supra note 17, at 783.
145. See Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger:
Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REV.
341, 349 (2002) (explaining that “[l]ike other third parties, when a lesbian
coparent seeks ongoing custody and visitation with the biological child of her
same-sex partner, she is often unsuccessful in overcoming the constitutional
principles of parental autonomy and privacy”).
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regulated institution.146
Presumably the State’s primary interest in marriage is
to promote the integrity of the family and create optimal
child rearing conditions. Marriage is assumed by
policymakers to be the best environment for raising healthy
and successful children, without demonstrable evidence.
Instead, parochial ideology plays the justifying role. For
example, the United States Congress considers marriage an
“essential institution of a successful society” and the optimal
environment for successful child rearing.147 The current
rationale, at least in part, is based on findings from “welfare
reform” legislation, known as the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of
1996.148 Among other things, Congress found that children
born out of wedlock, specifically to unwed mothers age
seventeen and under, are more likely to experience abuse
and neglect, have lower cognitive scores and educational
aspirations, become teenage parents themselves, and be on
welfare when they grow up.149
The State’s concerns with family values dovetails
seamlessly with the economic interest in preventing unwed
motherhood. Congress found that young, unwed mothers are
not only more likely to go on public assistance, but also more
likely to remain on public assistance for longer periods.
“These combined effects of ‘younger and longer’ increase total
AFDC [(aid to families with dependent children)] costs per
household by 25 percent to 30 percent for 17-year-olds.”150
Notably, Congress also found that an “increase in the
146. See generally Robson, supra note 17, at 795 (discussing the primacy of
marriage and the “zeal of elected federal officials to exalt marriage”); Zalesne,
supra note 137, at 1066–68.
147. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 101(2)–(3), 110 Stat. 2105, 2110 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601
note (2012) (Congressional Findings)).
148. Id.
149. Id. § 101(8)(B)–(F), 110 Stat. at 2111.
150. Id. § 101(8)(A), 110 Stat. at 2111.
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number of children receiving public assistance is closely
related to the increase in births to unmarried women,”
framed as a “problem” to be solved.151
Laws providing benefits to married people also attempt
to promote sexual behavioral norms. Marriage can be seen as
promoting abstinence from sex outside marriage, and in
particular, abstinence from premarital sex by teenagers and
young adults. Marriage also promotes monogamy and
opposite-sex relationships, and is often regarded as “the
expected standard of human sexual activity.” 152 The
government message fostered by sex education is that
marriage is the “only acceptable condition for sexual
expression.”153
The State’s promotion of traditional marriage as a means
of achieving conformity with normative sexual behavior,
family stability, and economic security is problematic for two
main reasons. First, the means-ends relationship is tenuous
and often reversed, propelling the myth that marriage
actually helps to achieve any of these goals, when the
government often uses these values to promote the
institution of marriage itself. Second, the means-ends
justification assumes that the government’s goals are in fact
legitimate.
Promoting traditional marriage is only tangentially
related to the goals of building stronger family units or
enhancing economic security. Interestingly, a 1990 United
States Department of Health and Human Services report
identifying characteristics of strong families references six
studies and forty-nine characteristics before the mention of
“marriage.”154 While “economic security” can play a role in

151. Id. § 101(5)(C), 110 Stat. at 2110.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 710(b)(2)(D) (2012).
153. Robson, supra note 17, at 798.
154. MARIA KRYSAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
IDENTIFYING SUCCESSFUL FAMILIES: AN OVERVIEW OF CONSTRUCTS AND SELECTED
MEASURES 20–22 (1990), http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/idsucfam.pdf.
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promoting a stronger family unit, it is not dispositive.
Economic security is more closely related with class and
socio-economic factors than with marriage. Congress fails to
consider how socio-economic conditions and government
(non)spending at the federal, state and local level, with
grossly inadequate services devoted to basic human need,
functions to leave the non-married vulnerable. By promoting
marriage through economic benefits, the State contributes to
economic stability and social acceptance, which may lead to
an easier lifestyle for married couples. Tax cuts for capital
investments also lead to an easier life for the investor. No
one would argue that because the beneficiaries of capital
gains tax-cuts are wealthy, the capital gains tax reduction is
what made them so—that is, unless one’s ideological lenses
require a government for the already privileged rather than
for the vulnerable, the function of the prevailing law around
marriage. In its promotion of marriage to achieve the goals
of “stability” and “happiness,” the government perpetuates
the monogamous marital paradigm and fails to consider the
larger socio-economic and class factors that play a much
more important role in determining outcomes.
Further, to the extent that monogamy has been justified
by arguments that people are happiest in monogamous
marriages, empirical evidence can be adduced that financial
stability is the cause of both the marriage and the happiness,
rather than monogamy being the cause of happiness. It is
arbitrary to say people will be happier in monogamous
relationships than in polygamous ones. The intimate
arrangements making Peter happy or Paul happy are, like
religious practice, up to them.155
Although the State exalts the virtues of abstinence

155. Sincere religious converts demonstrate that happiness is a function of the
relationship between the individual will and the manifestation of a particular
form of life. On the other hand, what has historically been called “piety” or
“piousness” is a function of the relationship between the manifestation of a
particular form of life and social approval. We are political liberals, interested in
citizens’ happiness, not their so-called piety.
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before marriage, monogamy, and other sexual behavioral
norms, promoting traditional marriage has little, if any,
effect on achieving these government ends. While the
government, in the past, has put significant resources
toward promoting abstinence before marriage,156 it is unclear
whether such promotion of “normative” behavior as a public
health goal is even realistic.157 Indeed, despite state efforts
to promote abstinence until marriage, “[a]lmost all
Americans have sex before marrying.”158
By subsidizing marriage through the enticement of a
bundle of economic benefits, the State lures couples into
marriage, using the ends—economic stability—to justify and
promote
the
means—marriage.
This
tautological
justification boils down to the State lauding marriage as a
means to achieving greater economic security, while at the
same time exclusively subsidizing married couples with
disparate incomes.
These State objectives are not necessarily legitimate.
The framing of marriage as a space for permissible sexual
expression implicates a free-speech-like analysis that sees
the State as arguably suppressing extra-marital sexual
expression. In the most recent major Supreme Court
articulation of the role of marriage in society, Obergefell v.
Hodges, granting the right to same-sex marriage, Justice
Kennedy ambiguously but conspicuously wrote that
marriage provides “other freedoms, such as expression.”159
So long as there remains only one form of marriage, the
content of the “expression” is largely meaningless. More
significant are the fact of marriage and the identity of the
156. Robson, supra note 17, at 797 As an example, from 1995 to 2000, Congress
increased federal funding for abstinence only sex-education by three thousand
percent. Elizabeth Arndorfer, Absent Abstinence Accountability, 27 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 585, 585–86 (2000).
157. Lawrence B. Finer, Trends in Premarital Sex in the United States, 1954–
2003, 122 PUB. HEALTH REP. 73, 73 (2007).
158. Id.
159. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015).
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participants. Thus if Steve, Ted, and Bob’s tantric trio is
denied a formally recognized marriage, their individual
expression as equal partners in a tantric trio is
suppressed.160
b. Beyond Marriage
Whatever the range of actual practices, the normatively
idealized form of life we call monogamy, in the abstract,
consists of the romantic ideal, the coming together of two
loving persons, ultimate mutual commitment, mutual
growth, lasting love, and meaningful mutual concern for one
another undisturbed by distracting passions. Similarly,
whatever the actual practices, in the abstract, the
normatively idealized form of life we may call multiple
marriage consists of a man with multiple wives or women
with multiple husbands with the same normative features as
monogamy, with “mutual” replaced by “cooperative.” Finally,
whatever the actual practices, the normatively idealized
form of life we call polyamory, in the abstract, consists of
multiple ongoing relationships either intermingled or
independent of each other in terms of substance but
dependent on consent to non-monogamy in each case, honest
and open communication, and trust among all partners. As
with the various religious normatively idealized forms of life,
the state justifiably privileges none of the above.
Most feminists and others rightly worry about the
exploitation of women who “choose” polygamy. It is thought
that the consent is not truly voluntary, or is weakened by the
need for financial security, power disparities, or religious
acceptance.161 Perhaps polygamy carries too much historical
baggage to ever be rectified in modern times. Critics of
polygamy are correct to say that in those particular cases
exploitation obtains. However, exploitation in those cases
derives from the involuntariness, the need for financial

160. See id.; supra introductory vignette.
161. See supra notes 128–131 and accompanying text.
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security, the power disparity, or the religious ideology, not
polygamy as such.162
While patriarchy and religious fanaticism are the roots
of exploitation and abuse in polygamous marriage, the same
could be said about exploitation and abuse in monogamous
marriage with no less force. Given the extensive feminist
critiques of monogamous marriage and coverture, and the
many ways that monogamous marriage has simply been a
tool of male power and inheritance, we can see that
oppression of women occurs in both monogamous and
polygamous marriage.
We retain the burden to confront the argument that
ostensible choice masks exploitation. First, exploitation can
be divided into structural exploitation and transactional
exploitation. Marxist political theorists tend to believe that
society’s economic institutions are arranged such that
workers are structurally exploited. Marxist feminists tend to
believe that marriage in all of its forms, whether
monogamous or polygamous, is structurally exploitative of
women in that women’s vulnerability is both the cause and
effect of the prevailing marital structure. Transactional
exploitation, however, is exploitation in a single transaction,
as when an artist selling a painting at an auction gets $100
as the highest bid when the $100 dollar bidder mendaciously
told all potentially higher bidders that the auction was
cancelled.163

162. Subordination of women in our society stems from and rests on deeply
ingrained social norms and economic structures. “It is generally assumed that
women in America are better off than women in other countries.” Ray Jablonksi,
Five Reasons Why Gender Inequality is Worse in U.S. Than Elsewhere in the
World, CLEVELAND.COM (Dec. 20, 2015), https://www.cleveland.com/nation/
index.ssf/2015/12/five_reasons_why_gender_inequa.html. However, the United
States is far behind international standards in gender pay inequality, maternity
leave, affordable childcare, women’s reproductive rights, and violence against
women. Id.
163. Alan Wertheimer & Matt Zwolinski, Exploitation, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL. (Dec. 20, 2001), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/exploitation/ (last
updated Aug. 16, 2016).
OF
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Structural exploitation occurs when the ‘rules of the
game’ favor some people against others, as when monopolies
obstruct a free market or a manufacturer benefits from
tariffs on foreign goods.164 Similarly, transactional
exploitation occurs “when A gains more from an interaction,
and B gains less, than they would have were it not for the
existence of a prior injustice”165 or “background injustice.”166
In other words, exploitation consists of a voluntary action,
the benefits of which are less than they would have been if
the procedure or background institutions were fair.
Oppression of women in polygamous relationships
historically results from background conditions more than
from mere participation in polygamy because the conditions
out of which a woman chooses to enter a polygamous
relationship (e.g., economic vulnerability, religious ideology)
or the actual background conditions in society (e.g.,
patriarchy or repressive theocracy) corrupt the procedure
ushering the ostensibly free choice. In the United States,
there are believed to be between 50,000 and 100,000
practicing polygamists, most of whom are Muslim and
Mormon families.167 These families often practice polygamy
based upon a fundamentalist interpretation of early Mormon
and Islam teachings, giving rise to conditions ripe for
oppression of women participants. Polygamy is for the most
part nonexistent outside the practices of these two

164. See generally Hillel Steiner, A Liberal Theory of Exploitation, 94 ETHICS
225 (1984).
165. Wertheimer & Zwolinski, supra note 163.
166. Hillel Steiner on Exploitation, PHILOSOPHY BITES (Aug. 9, 2010),
http://hwcdn.libsyn.com/p/c/1/0/c10808047bb6209d/Hillel_Steiner_on_Exploitati
on.mp3?c_id=2149582&expiration=1501995224&hwt=efa5b1747d88dc3e57cb21
15ccb0a584.
167. Samantha Allen, Polygamy is More Popular Than Ever, THE DAILY BEAST
(Jun. 2, 2015, 5:15 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/06/02/
polygamy-is-more-popular-than-ever.html (noting that “[r]ough estimates place
the polygamous population in the U.S. somewhere between 50,000 and 100,000
people, chiefly in Muslim and fundamentalist Mormon families”).
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religions,168 and there is little to no evidence surrounding
polygamy divorced from religious practices. Thus, while
polygamy is most often associated with the religious
patriarchal teachings surrounding the practice, oppression of
women is not necessarily inherent in the practice of
polygamy as a stand-alone “normatively idealized form of
life,” and cannot logically be considered the result of the
practice of three- or four-person marital relations.
While historically there is great evidence of oppression
in polygamous relationships, contract law and criminal law
already contain protections against exploitation and abuse.
In terms of the initial decision to enter a polygamous
relationship, the contract defenses of duress, undue
influence, and unconscionability ask the factual question of
whether the weaker party effectively had alternative courses
of action available and whether she entered into the contract
voluntarily with full knowledge.169 The contract defense of
capacity mandates that a contract entered with a minor is
voidable at the option of the minor.170 In terms of abuse
during the marriage, state assault and battery laws aim to
prevent a man from physically abusing his wife. Federal laws
like the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 171 provide
additional layers of protection for women suffering from
domestic violence, sexual assault and other types of violence
against women.172 Since contract and criminal law already

168. It is difficult to pin point exactly who practices polygamy given that it is
outlawed in many parts of the world, but it is generally believed that polygamy
in the US “flourishes in self-segregated communities, Mormon-fundamentalist
and Muslim-immigrant, rather than being widely distributed across society.”
Ross Douthat, The Prospects For Polygamy, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/31/opinion/sunday/ross-douthat-the-prospects
-for-polygamy.html?_r=1.
169. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 175, 177, 208 (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
170. See id. §§ 12, 14.
171. 42 U.S.C. § 13701 (2012).
172. OFF. ON WOMEN’S HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., LAWS
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, https://www.womenshealth.gov/violence-against-
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maintain the tools to conduct these types of analyses,
oppression in polygamous relationships, in theory, can be
controlled.
The potential for polyamorous plural marriage presents
another opportunity to locate alleged intrinsic harms on
contingent background factors. Polyamory is simply the
practice of having ongoing intimate and/or romantic
relationships with more than one person, whether
independent relationships or unions of three or more
people.173 The alleged harms derive from the ideological
presumption that monogamy is to be understood as moral
and proper, universally and for its own sake, natural rather
than a political institution. With greater numbers of people
involved in the romantic lives of participants, it is natural
that there will be increased complexity and increased
partner turnover. The emotional complexity of interacting
intimately with more people appears to be inherent to this
love style. If emotional upheaval—including jealousy or fear
of abandonment—goes with the territory of intimate
relating, the chances of emotional upheaval increase
exponentially when multiple partners are involved. 174
However, jealous lovers may be more inclined toward
monogamy while people less likely by constitution to be
jealous may be more open to polyamory. Either way, respect
for autonomy is the just policy.
In addition, the framing of polyamorous practices as
cheating-lite or as an attempt to mitigate the despair of
monogamy pathologizes polyamory by characterizing it as a
defensive mechanism or an escape. Many couples, however,
consider it a thrill or simply a realistic approach to complex,
human sexuality.
women/laws-on-violence-against-women/ (last updated Mar. 2, 2018).
173. Ann E. Tweedy, Polyamory as a Sexual Orientation, 79 U. CIN. L. REV.
1461, 1479 (2011).
174. See generally Deborah Anapol, The Downside of Polyamory, PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY (Nov. 27, 2010), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/love-withoutlimits/201011/the-downside-polyamory.
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Increased partner turnover can also have negative
effects on the children involved. Children report
experiencing some pain at losing the friendship of adults no
longer involved in their lives.175 This loss, as differentiated
from loss of a parent from divorce, may be worse because in
many cases of divorce there is visitation and continued
parental involvement of both parents.176 Finally, there is
currently reported bias against polyamorous parents in the
legal system, social disapproval (specifically the risk of
rejection by family, friends and coworkers), and
discrimination.
However, there are benefits associated with polyamory,
including accelerated personal growth. With polyamory, it is
possible to get the benefit of several lifetimes worth of
mistakes in a short time because multiple ongoing intimate
relationships present complex dilemmas and opportunities
to act with integrity. Because multiple-partner relationships
are inherently more complex and demanding than
monogamous ones and because they challenge the norms of
our culture, they offer unique valuable learning
opportunities.177 Children raised in polyamorous households
may benefit alongside their parents. “These children are
more insightful and wise, and open to understanding
diversity and many forms of religion and culture.”178
“Polyamory can help men and women break out of
dysfunctional sex roles and achieve more equal, sexually

175. Bella DePaulo, Is Polyamory Bad for the Children?, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY:
LIVING SINGLE (Jan. 8, 2013), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/livingsingle/201301/is-polyamory-bad-the-children.
176. Karen Ruskin, Polyamory – Not Healthy for Children, DR. KAREN RUSKIN
(Oct. 28, 2013) http://www.drkarenruskin.com/polyamory-not-healthy-forchildren/.
177. Deborah Anapol, The Upside of Polyamory, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY: LOVE
LIMITS (Dec. 22, 2010), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/lovewithout-limits/201012/the-upside-polyamory.
WITHOUT

178. Melissa Hogenboom, Polyamorous Relationships May Be the Future of
Love, BBC NEWS (Jun. 23, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20160623polyamorous-relationships-may-be-the-future-of-love.
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gratifying, and respectful relationships simply because of its
novelty.”179
Polyamory’s benefits can extend to the duties of everyday
life.
More adults sharing parenting can mean less stress and less
burnout without losing any of the rewards. In a larger group of men
and women, it’s more likely that one or two adults will be willing
and able to stay home and care for the family or that each could be
available one or two days a week. If one parent dies or becomes
disabled, other family members can fill the gap. It’s possible for
children to have more role models, more playmates, and more love
in a group environment.180

Polyamory might also have financial benefits.
“Polyamory can mean a higher standard of living while
consuming fewer resources. Sexualoving partners are more
likely than friends or neighbors to feel comfortable sharing
housing, transportation, appliances, and other resources.”181
Polyamory may be good for the social life as well.
“[P]olyamorous people tend to maintain more friendships as
they keep a wider social network. They are also less likely to
cut off contact after a break-up. Monogamous couples on the
other hand, often withdraw from their friends in the first,
loved-up stages of their relationship.”182 Lastly, polyamory
could benefit everyone in existing relationships by adding
spark and fulfillment to a healthy relationship and removing
“the fear inherent in some monogamous relationships related
to the potential for abandonment.”183
Nonetheless, the relevant factor in evaluating the justice
as fairness of State policy is not whether polyamorous
practices are beneficial, but whether they are, more or less
sufficiently and inherently harmful to warrant unequal
179. Anapol, supra note 177.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Hogenboom, supra note 178.
183. Ian Kerner, Rethinking Monogamy Today, CNN (Apr. 12, 2017, 5:17 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/12/health/monogamy-sex-kerner/index.html.
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treatment or even criminalization. Since the alleged harms
associated with polyamory are located on contingent
background factors, the evidence suggests otherwise. The
aim here is to formalize already existing practices so as to
facilitate, not determine, private activity based on private
choices.
3. The Importance of State Neutrality: The Analogy
Between Marriage & Religion
Insofar as the justification for State-sanctioned
monogamy is that people will be “happier” in one way or
another, the State is violating the principle of liberalism that
the State should not promote one conception of the good life
over another, especially in a pluralistic society.
Establishment Clause184 jurisprudence provides useful
analytical tools and precedent—the State similarly takes no
position on which of the many religions will lead to
happiness, spiritual fulfillment or eternal paradise. Both
marriage and religion are normatively idealized forms of life,
inherently contested and existing in various forms. For both,
as far as the state is concerned, neutrality is the just
governing principle. The Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment is concerned more than anywhere else in United
States law with rigorous adherence to the principle of state
neutrality.
Our government treats religion with neutrality because
religion is considered profoundly personal, a matter of
conscience, and an intimate relation with the divine—either
through scripture, mystical experience, ritual practices or
tradition. The State, consistent with the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause, may never privilege, endorse, involve
itself with, nor act with animus toward any religion. The
founding generation, enlightened by the period following the
religious wars in Europe, knew the dangers of a Stateestablished church and appreciated the rights of religious

184. U.S. CONST. amend I.
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minorities—arguably, Washington, Jefferson, and Madison
each did not believe in the Christian god.
The comparably deeply personal nature of marriage,
household constitution, and family formation also trigger the
value of State neutrality in this area of the law. In the words
of Justice Black, the Establishment Clause “stands as an
expression of principle on the part of the Founders of our
Constitution that religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy
to permit its ‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil
magistrate.”185 “Religion” can easily be replaced with
“household constitution” or “family formation.” The “civil
magistrate” has no more business interfering in marital
relationships than in congregational ones.
The Court fails to treat marriage like religion, as a
normatively idealized form of life manifesting in various
forms. In the nineteenth century, the Reynolds Court stated,
“it is within the legitimate scope of the power of every civil
government to determine whether polygamy or monogamy
shall be the law of social life under its dominion.”186 The
current government policy privileges monogamy over
polygamy now no less than as articulated then. The modern
reaction to this line tests our commitment to the principles
underlying the liberal state and poses the question: should
the state “determine . . . the law of social life”187 in the
private space where ”freedoms, such as expression, intimacy,
and spirituality”188 are pursued in private life?
Under the Establishment Clause, the government policy
must have a secular purpose and not simply a “sham secular

185. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 432 (1962) (holding that a New York State
program offering nondenominational, optional prayer time in public schools
violated the Establishment Clause because the program was religious in nature,
carried out by the government, and imposed indirect coercive pressure on
students).
186. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
187. Id.
188. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015).
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purpose” masking a religiously motivated policy. 189 If so, as
long as there are neither excessive entanglements between
the government and religion nor the privileging or burdening
thereof, then the government policy will be upheld.190 The
Supreme Court has explained:
When a governmental entity professes a secular purpose for an
arguably religious policy, the government’s characterization is, of
course, entitled to some deference. But it is nonetheless the duty of
the courts to distinguish a sham secular purpose from a sincere
one.191

The judicial duty articulated is especially important
considering what is at stake. Justice Stevens explained that
the Establishment Clause is intended not only to protect us
from explicit state coercion of citizens in favor of religion, but
also from more imperceptible harms that both grow and hide
with time:
[T]he Constitution also requires that we keep in mind the myriad
and subtle ways in which Establishment Clause values can be
eroded . . . and that we guard against other different, yet equally
important, constitutional injuries. One is the mere passage by the
District of a policy that has the purpose and perception of
government establishment of religion.192

Here, the Court is concerned with Establishment Clause
“values,” not rules or elements. The injury, more abstract in
nature, is a government policy that confuses the parochial for
the universal and private interest for public interest. Our
prevailing government policy toward marriage confuses the
parochial for the universal in that monogamy is considered
both universally desired for all individuals as well as fitting
and proper for each and every community in multi-cultural
189. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (holding that a
student led “invocation” before a high school football game had a religious
purpose, despite its characterization by school administrators).
190. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613–15 (1971).
191. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 308 (internal quotation, alteration,
and citation omitted).
192. Id. at 314 (emphasis added) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

2018]

FROM MARRIAGE TO HOUSEHOLDS

959

America. In addition, our prevailing government policy
toward marriage confuses public interest for private interest.
The private interest is the perpetuation of Victorian sexual
norms. The public interest, however, is State neutrality.
Establishment Clause jurisprudence also illustrates the
way ideology and judicial overemphasis on “history and
traditions” corrupts justice as fairness. For instance, in an
opinion upholding the constitutionality of a memorial of the
Ten Commandments at the Texas State Capitol, Chief
Justice Rehnquist posited that, “[o]ur institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being.”193 Actually, Thomas Paine
was a flaming atheist, George Washington and Thomas
Jefferson were demonstrably skeptical of the interventionist
notion of God, and the role of the secular legal profession and
argumentation in the Federalist Papers and elsewhere
undergirded our constitution-making process. Despite our
country’s current religious culture, statistics regarding the
rising number of atheists today also belie that fact. 194
Elsewhere, in a case upholding the constitutionality
under the Establishment Clause of an official, tax-funded
chaplain formally leading prayer before the Nebraska State
Legislature, the Court engaged in a form of constitutional
interpretation that, if applied in other contexts, would reduce
our judicial institutions to a power serving formalism and
our society to zombie-like eternal recurrence:
Clearly the men who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clauses
did not view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a
violation of that Amendment, for the practice of opening sessions
with prayer has continued without interruption ever since that
early session of Congress . . . [and] legislative and other deliberative
public bodies with prayer is deeply embedded in the history and

193. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 683 (2005).
194. Michael Lipka, Ten Facts About Atheists, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 1,
2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/06/01/10-facts-about-atheists/
(finding that “the share of Americans who identify as atheists has roughly
doubled in the past several years”).
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tradition of this country.195

In these cases, the Court disproportionately weighed as
a factor the contingencies of social habit and practices both
in the background, and in the actual legal analysis, contrary
to the underlying purposes of the Establishment Clause.
This emphasis sets the frame for a prejudicial legal analysis.
In a different constitutional context, the Due Process
Clause, fewer unjust policies are now saved by their
histories. Justice Kennedy writes of “substantive”
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause jurisprudence
in the Obergefell majority decision:
If [fundamental] rights were defined by who exercised them in the
past, then received practices could serve as their own continued
justification and new groups could not invoke rights once
denied . . . . History and tradition guide and discipline [courts
when] . . . identifying interests of the person so fundamental that
the State must accord them its respect[,] but do not set its outer
boundaries[; t]hat method respects our history and learns from it
without allowing the past alone to rule the present.196

The trend toward de-emphasis of “history and tradition”
in Due Process Clause analysis is a good sign for progressivethinking people, and polygamy has been explicitly addressed
in that context. With respect to polygamous marriage, for
example, Chief Justice Roberts responded to Justice
Kennedy’s assertion that, under a Due Process Clause
analysis, “the right to personal choice regarding marriage is
inherent in the concept of individual autonomy”197 with a
passage that is worth quoting in full:
It is striking how much of the majority’s reasoning would apply
with equal force to the claim of a fundamental right to plural
marriage. If “[t]here is dignity in the bond between two men or two
women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to make such
profound choices,” why would there be any less dignity in the bond
between three people who, in exercising their autonomy, seek to

195. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786, 788 (1983).
196. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598, 2602 (2015) (emphasis added).
197. Id. at 2599.
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make the profound choice to marry? If a same-sex couple has the
constitutional right to marry because their children would
otherwise “suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow
lesser,” why wouldn’t the same reasoning apply to a family of three
or more persons raising children? If not having the opportunity to
marry “serves to disrespect and subordinate” gay and lesbian
couples, why wouldn’t the same “imposition of this disability,” serve
to disrespect and subordinate people who find fulfillment in
polyamorous relationships?198

The legal principles articulated above, although
pursuant to the First Amendment and Due Process Clauses,
are transferable to our understanding of marriage as a
contract. The religious, ideological, ethical, or moral views of
eighteenth century slaveholding men are not relevant factors
in constitutional interpretation in the liberal paradigm or
any other concerned with justice and fairness in a large,
twenty-first century multicultural democracy.
B. Marriage as Private Contract
Family now, more than any time in human history, is
voluntary and private by virtue of consent and the range of
possible household structures.199 Because the family can be
considered a private institution consisting of voluntary
members, the State has no authority or interest in
intervening absent serious identifiable harms to identifiable
persons.200 As private arrangements, intimate relations
should be governed instead by principles of privacy and
autonomy.

198. Id. at 2621–22 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting the majority
opinion at 2599, 2600, 2604).
199. See Zalesne, supra note 137, at 1027–34.
200. Some thoughtful people might say that it was a mistake to treat domestic
violence as a private matter rather than a matter of public concern. However,
domestic violence may be distinguished in two ways: (1) the prevalence of
foresight and consent in the case of reproductive autonomy and Assisted
Reproductive Technology is missing in a domestic violence case; and (2) in the
case of domestic violence, there is a clear identifiable harm to an identifiable
person.
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1. Marriage as a Private Institution
Intimate relations are not social enterprises, but rather
private arrangements, and should therefore be governed by
principles of privacy and autonomy. Insofar as marriage is
treated as a public arrangement, private life becomes an arm
of the state; but a just state is the arm of a free people.
In a private institution, the participants are the
stakeholders. With the exception of minors, participants are
members voluntarily. In a public institution, on the other
hand, the participants are not the only stakeholders.
Instead, general members of the public that are ultimately
influenced or affected by the institution involuntarily are
stakeholders. In this Section, we make the argument that,
since family is private, the State should involve itself no
further in family formation than to enforce private
contractual arrangements made on the basis of meaningful
choice and consent.
Consent, market forces, and contract law, based on
individual needs, individual desires, and societal demand,
are best for dealing with people’s varied private interests.201
People have a fundamental right, both morally and legally,
to privacy and freedom when it comes to personal
relationships, so intervention where there are private
agreements is not usually justified unless there is
identifiable harm to identifiable individuals.202 However,
when parties attempt to define the contours of their families
and secure rights through contract, they are often met with

201. See Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between
Classical Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV. 769, 817–18
(1985) (explaining that “[t]he private contract establishes a first-order
relationship based on individual needs and desires”).
202. Despite ongoing resistance by a sizeable segment of the population to
reproductive freedom (evident by the development of the law regarding
contraception and abortion), individual choice today already generally guides
reproduction, which arguably is more complex than marriage and intimate
relationships because of the fact that decisions generally affect an unborn child.
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legal hostility.203 Despite the fact that their contracts are
between private parties, and even when those parties have
given full consent, such contracts continue to be either
unevenly enforced or unenforceable altogether.204 Courts do
not enforce family contracts in the same ways they enforce
contracts outside the family context, as principles of freedom
of contract are not applied in the same ways and to the same
degree in the family context.205
For those who believe that the law already treats
marriage as a contract, consider the words of Canadian
Political Philosopher Will Kymlicka. When it comes to
marriage:
there is no written document, each party gives up its right to selfprotection, the terms of the contract cannot be renegotiated, neither
party need understand its terms, it must be between two and only
two people, and [until 2013] these two people must be one man and
one woman.206

Such non-waivable provisions belie the notion that the
contractual arrangement is the outcome of meaningful
choices and prudent planning on behalf of the participants.
Despite the fact that marriage is one the most important
relations in most people’s lives, the participants have as little
say in the terms and conditions as they do over the terms and
conditions of clickwrap agreements.207
2. Autonomy, Assent, and Meaningful Choice
As long as the natural restrictive parameters of informed
203. Zalesne, supra note 137, at 1030.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Will Kymlicka, Rethinking the Family, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 77, 88
(1991).
207. Clickwrap agreements are agreements entered over the Internet under
which users must agree to terms and conditions before using a company’s services
or products. Typically, a user has no ability to negotiate the terms before
agreeing. See NANCY S. KIM, WRAP AGREEMENTS (2013).
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consent in contract law are policed, private agreements
concerning any variety of intimate relationships, including
polyamory or even polygamy, should be enforced within just
communitarian parameters (likely varying among
jurisdictions), so as to give credibility to the two-person
marriage option as a meaningful choice among alternatives,
so as to recognize the wide array of possible conceptions of
the good life, and so as to respect the autonomy of individual
participants.
Meaningful choice requires more than one reasonable
option and an absence of coercion. In order for choice
surrounding marriage to be meaningful, women and men
must have the option of exercising choice with respect to
whether and whom to marry. Thus, arrangements other than
two-person marriage, such as being unmarried, polygamous,
or polyamorous, which are not inherently harmful, should be
available and recognized by the State, with the participants
determined by the parties to the union themselves. Available
options might include intimate non-sexual partnerships with
or without cohabitation and with or without formal
recognition, intimate sexual partnerships with or without
cohabitation and with or without formal recognition,
temporary marriage, polygyny, polyandry, polyamory, multigenerational cohabiting families, or any other relationship as
conceived by the people involved.
Other values in addition to autonomy, such as pluralism
and fairness, are also respected by our approach. Here,
recognizing and validating autonomy simply expands the
choices available to individuals, legitimizing such choice as a
choice. At the same time, our proposal potentially alleviates
some of the violence against women and economic
subjugation associated with traditional marriage because
the legal family unit will no longer rest upon dyadic
dependency and domination. We argue not for polygamy but
for the woman’s right to choose polygamy or any other
household arrangement she sees fit for her. What might be
called “out possibilities” available to women will lessen
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dependency. If, as we argued above, exploitation is incidental
to polygamy and other relationships, it can be policed
through criminal law and contract law, which shows its
inherent concern with social norms, fairness, and inequality
through doctrines such as the duty of good faith, and
defenses such as unconscionability. Accordingly, regulation
or prohibition of the various relationship possibilities is
redundant, over-inclusive, and violates the paramount
principles of political liberalism and autonomy. Otherwise,
the choice to marry remains “only [a] Hobson’s choice, ‘that
or none,’”208 rather than a meaningful choice among
alternatives.
Restricting a woman’s autonomy and freedom of contract
imposes a detriment on women under the guise of protecting
them from exploitation when alternative protective
measures are available. Not all men and women relate to
marriage in the same way. Rather than making
presumptions based on the sanctity of two-person marriage,
presumptions are instead warranted in favor of the
competence of people who are exercising their right to selfdetermination by making thoughtful and informed decisions.
To that end, pertaining to intimate contracts, participants
must be given the (economic) choice not to marry, as well as
a meaningful array of options if they do choose to “marry.”
One’s choice here should not affect whatsoever one’s
privileged relation to the State.
Under various contracts defenses, one of the ways a
party can show that a contract was not voluntarily entered
is to show that he or she had no meaningful choice but to
enter the contract—a “Hobson’s choice.” This can result from
a threat by the other party, as with duress,209 or because the
thing contracted for was, for example, a necessity and there
208. MILL, supra note 33, at 51.
209. Under the defense of duress, a contract is unenforceable if “a party’s
manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that
leaves the victim no reasonable alternative.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 175 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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was only one available seller, as with unconscionability. 210
Thus, in order for consent to be voluntary, parties must
generally enter the contract of their own free will, with
meaningful options, including the option of walking away
from the contract. The existing marriage contract violates
this basic principle of contract law.
Choice must, of course, be real, and based on paramount
contract principles—participants must engage in private
agreements voluntarily and without coercion. In this Section,
we set out to show that the existing state-sponsored
marriage contract is based on veiled economic coercion and
the lack of other meaningful alternatives.
First, the State gives such large economic incentives to
marry211 that a rational economic actor has no economic
choice (unless he or she is sufficiently wealthy) but to
marry.212 Requiring marriage as a means of receiving
government benefits and protections artificially restricts
private decisions and behavior regarding intimate relations,
making marriage effectively “compulsory,”213 rather than
freely chosen. Indeed, if given the economic choice, some
couples would undoubtedly choose not to marry, because of,
for example, the traditional norms and trappings of that
institution, the hetero-normative implications, or the general
government control over family.214 Across her published
works, Professor Robson argues that matrimony, like

210. A contract is generally unenforceable due to unconscionability where
there is the “absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties
together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other
party.” Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
211. See supra note 139 and accompanying text; see also Zalesne, supra note
137, at 1036–37.
212. See supra Section II(A)(1).
213. Robson, supra note 18, at 314 (2009) (arguing that “marriage is a political
institution” and that “the desire or choice to marry” should be “open to question”).
214. See Robson, supra note 17, at 712 (noting that “marriage implicates
serious and insoluble problems of equality”).
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heterosexuality, may not be a “preference at all but
something that has had to be imposed, managed, organized,
propagandized, and maintained by force.”215
Then, if individuals “choose” to marry because of
financial necessity or because it is economically wise to do so,
they in effect have no meaningful choice when the State
mandates that marriage be between two people. A choice is
not a true choice where there are no other options. Such
“coercive aspects of the phenomenon of marriage”216
delegitimize the “choice.” Of course, individuals or couples
are free to reject the single, default, state-sanctioned terms,
but only at the expense of equal access to a variety of
economic benefits.
To legitimize the significance of the two-person marriage
option and to recognize the rich variety of possible
alternative relationships and the wide array of possible
conceptions of the good life, polygamy, polyamory, and other
alternative relationships should be available as options. If
the choice to legally marry is made without other Staterecognized household options, and without the true economic
option not to marry, then choice is illusory and marriage
success rates should be expected to be low.
Accepting the notion that intimate agreements must be
compatible with respect for autonomy, the question remains
whether a polygamous relationship, including one that
develops based on gender hierarchies, can ever actually be
based on autonomy and consent. Is such a marital hierarchy
“inextricable from a larger system of oppression, such that it
is impossible to consider it as freely chosen and untainted by
injustice?”217 Certainly if that were the case, then it would be
meaningless to offer such relationships only to then regulate

215. Id. at 780 (internal citation omitted); Robson, supra note 18, at 313
(internal quotations, citations, and alterations omitted).
216. Robson, supra note 17, at 746.
217. Elizabeth Brake, Equality and Non-Hierarchy in Marriage: What do
Feminists Really Want?, in AFTER MARRIAGE, supra note 19, at 109.
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and ultimately prohibit each and every instance of them. We
attempt to show, however, that it is not the case.
To presume a woman is unable to grant consent to a nonmonogamous union presumes that polygamous and
polyamorous relationships inherently involve men who use
greater social power to exploit vulnerable women. It
presumes all women have a natural monogamous mating
instinct that would prevent them from ever voluntarily
choosing otherwise. The presumptions are based on the
fundamental premise that absent a religious or financial
motive, women would not choose non-monogamous
relationships, unless they were being exploited. This set of
presumptions tends to be predicated on the market’s
valuation of monogamy and social expectations that
marriage is between two people, rather than on actual
preferences borne out by empirical and statistical evidence.
The presumptions buy into deep-seeded but untested
cultural values and severely undermine women’s autonomy
and contractual freedom.
Culturally speaking, a more modern conception of
polyamory is more likely to be seen as arising from full
consent than a polygamous relationship. Indeed, the notion
that men are the only ones asking for extramarital partners
is not completely true. OpenMinded.com, a site for people
looking for open relationships, surveyed over 64,000 couples
registered to use the site, and discovered that “[o]f the
couples engaging in open relationships, two-thirds of them
say it was the woman’s idea.” 218 This contradicts the
argument that women are often unwilling and coerced
participants of polyamory.
Indeed, there are many legitimate reasons, not involving
coercion, that a woman might choose an alternative marriage
relationship. Women may choose non-monogamous

218. Ian Lang, Survey Finds Women More Likely to Propose Open
Relationships, ASKMEN (Sept. 9, 2015), http://uk.askmen.com/news/dating
/survey-finds-women-more-likely-to-propose-open-relationships.html.
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relationships to avoid the limitations that often come with
conventional marriage. “Free love rejected the tyranny of
conventional marriage, and particularly how it limited
women’s lives to child-bearing, household drudgery, legal
powerlessness, and, often enough, loveless sex.”219
Women might also be steering away from monogamous
relationships because of the effects on their sex drive. Per
conventional wisdom, women are more likely to want a
monogamous relationship because they seek emotional
connections, while men simply want sex. However, research
has shown that “women’s libidos tend to nose-dive when they
are in a long-term relationship, but the same is not true for
men.”220 While a decreased libido might seem to make
monogamy easier for women, overall, sex experts believe that
a diminished sex drive is not actually a healthy state for
women.221
Finally, some women might be willing to relinquish
power in the relationship in exchange for access to a higher
standard of living. It is thought, for example, that, “[s]ome
Mormon women consider polygamy a solution to such
difficulties as single motherhood, poverty, loneliness and
work/family conflicts.”222 Deborah Rhode notes that among
some African-American women, “man sharing,” as another
example, is considered a route to family stability in
communities where high rates of imprisonment and
unemployment have created a shortage of potential
219. Libby Copeland, Making Love and Trouble, SLATE (Mar. 12, 2012, 12:51
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2012/03/polyamory_and_its
_surprisingly_woman_friendly_roots_.html.
220. Melissa Dahl, Women Aren’t Hardwired for Monogamy, Men Don’t Hit
Their ‘Sexual Peak’ Early, and 3 More Things We Get Wrong About Sex, THE CUT
(Jun. 25, 2015, 12:57 PM), https://www.thecut.com/2014/06/women-arent-wiredfor-monogamy-and-more-myths.html.
221. Id. (noting that “women are losing their desire to initiate sex or to have
sex with their partners, which does not reflect sexual health”).
222. DEBORAH L. RHODE, ADULTERY: INFIDELITY AND THE LAW 122 (2016)
(arguing for partial legalization of polygamy—continued prohibition of multiple
marriage licenses, but decriminalization of polygamous cohabitation).
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husbands.223
Given that intimate contracts, household formation, and
dissolution planning are private affairs and supremely
personal, the State should not involve itself in the terms and
conditions of such family planning but for its legitimate role
in preventing unconscionable family contracts. By analogy to
contract law, the State’s role is to enforce the private
contracts that free and autonomous persons choose to create.
For the State to recognize versions of household constitution
that it favors and fail to enforce, even criminalize, contracts
that it disfavors, is to trample on autonomy and exclude
forms of life. Instead, a paradigmatic shift in the law from
marriages to households respects both autonomy and
diversity, while the freedom of the individual is honored in
the provision of a range of choice within a laissez-faire
approach to deeply personal, intimate relations.
II. FROM MARRIAGES TO HOUSEHOLDS: RESPECT FOR
MEANINGFUL CHOICE
Today, a majority of families in the United States can
now be considered what historically has been “nontraditional,” including unmarried cohabitating couples, 224
same-sex couples,225 single-parent households,226 and
223. Id. at 123.
224. The number of non-married heterosexual couples has been increasing
rapidly, and the numbers are predicted to continue escalating. Cynthia Grant
Bowman, Social Science and Legal Policy: The Case of Heterosexual Cohabitation,
9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 34 (2007).
225. With growing social acceptance, more and more same-sex couples are
openly living together and starting families. Jason M. Merrill, Note, Two Steps
Behind: The Law’s Struggle to Keep Pace with the Changing Dynamics of the
American Family, 11 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 509, 510 (2009).
226. Single-parent families are the quickest growing family form in America,
tripling since 1960. Single-parent families constitute approximately thirty
percent of all families with children under age eighteen. CHILD TRENDS
DATABANK, FAMILY STRUCTURE: INDICATORS OF CHILD AND YOUTH WELL-BEING 2–
3 (2015), https://www.childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/59_Family
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extended-family households,227 as well as older parents.228
Consistent with this trend is the rise of non-monogamous
intimate relationships and arrangements, including
relationships involving more than two people. Sexually nonmonogamous couples in the United States number in the
millions.229 Although the lack of a single definition for who
counts as “polyamorous” makes determining how many of
those people are “poly” a bit more difficult, the general trends
toward greater tolerance in family formations are clear and
are unlikely to reverse course any time soon.
Multigenerational family living (a household that
includes two or more adult generations) is also common and
on the rise. In 2016, according to a new Pew Research Center
analysis of census data, a record 64 million Americans or
20% of the United States population lived in
multigenerational households.230 Though there are very few
statistics, there are also various forms of intimate, nonsexual
partnerships. Some anecdotal evidence suggests that
intimate (nonsexual) partnerships take the form of platonic
parenting (married people who end their love-based
marriage but who choose to stay together to raise the
_Structure.pdf (last visited July 8, 2018).
227. Families with multiple caregivers can form a “family network” that may
include stepparents, grandparents, and a variety of other caregivers such as
blood relatives, neighbors, or family friends, either as primary or in addition to
primary caregivers. See id. at 2. Such extended families often offer children a
community of adults that they can consistently rely on for care and support. See
id.
228. M. Elliott Neal, Protecting Women: Preserving Autonomy in the
Commodification of Motherhood, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 611, 613 (2011).
229. “[M]ost researchers estimate that a full 4–5 percent of Americans
participate in some form of ethical non-monogamy. Estimates based on actually
trying sexual non-monogamy are around 1.2 to 2.4 million, and an estimate based
solely on the agreement to allow satellite lovers is around 9.8 million.” Brenden
Shucart, Polyamory By the Numbers, ADVOCATE (Jan. 8, 2016, 8:01 AM),
http://www.advocate.com/current-issue/2016/1/08/polyamory-numbers.
230. D’vera Cohn & Jeffrey S. Passel, A Record 60.6 Million Americans Live in
Multigenerational Households, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Aug. 11, 2016)
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/04/05/a-record-64-million-americans
-live-in-multigenerational-households/ (last updated Apr. 5, 2018).
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children)231 and people (oftentimes gay men or women) who
decide to raise a child with a friend.232
The solution we propose, in order to accommodate these
alternative arrangements and respect autonomy, is to treat
marriage as a contract like any other. Reflecting the existing
social reality regarding marriage and intimate relationships,
we offer a new legal category meant to supplant marriage
that we call households, which identifies a unit of people that
has chosen to enter a contractual relationship. The
contractual household, rather than marriage status, would
serve as the general, non-parochial unit of people relevant to
state policymaking. As already built into the law of contracts,
in order to show consent to a household, the relationship
must be entered voluntarily, with full capacity, and without
undue influence, duress, or unconscionability.
The concept and empirical reality of various types of
households are compatible with our vision of political
liberalism and State neutrality articulated above in that the
household is the most primary or general unit encompassing
sub-arrangements worth contracting for and is due equal
state recognition and treatment. The household is the
common genus over and above monogamous, polygamous,
and polyamorous marriages, as well as over intimate
friendships, sibling and inter-generational child raising, or a
flat of bachelors. State equal treatment and recognition of
households threatens no basic principles of political
liberalism and State neutrality.
Business partnerships offer a legal model for
households.233 We take from the “business” element the
231. Vicki Larson, Forget Conscious Uncoupling: The Way Forward for
Families is Platonic Parenting, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 15, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2015/apr/15/forget-conscious-uncoupli
ng-families-platonic-parenting.
232. Ephi Stempler, Platonic, Until Death Do Us Part, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/fashion/platonic-gay-relationshipcouple.html.
233. For use of the partnership model as a guide to departure from the two-

2018]

FROM MARRIAGE TO HOUSEHOLDS

973

notion that the State need not interfere with the private
activity of free individuals pursuing their own ends. We take
from “partnership” the notion that each participant’s
voluntary contribution to the association is based on trust
among all that “we’re in this together.”
The Uniform Partnership Act of 1914 (UPA) defines a
partnership as “an association of two or more persons to
carry on as co-owners a business for profit . . . .”234 There are
no formalities to become a partnership, though parties can
enter a partnership agreement defining the contours of the
relationship. Importantly, partnership law does not limit
partnerships to two people.235 Similarly, with households,
the parties themselves would define who is a member of the
household, with no limits on the number of participants.
Households would replace marriages in receiving the State
allocated benefits traditionally provided to married couples.
Though our justification for the household paradigm is
lengthy, our definition of households is intentionally brief
because the concept is as open-ended as a contract. We
envision households encompassing associations of various
types. Some may pertain to childcare, others to single sisters’
sororities. Our proposed framework would allow for the
formation of communal families not dependent on romantic
love, but also undoubtedly compatible with it, as business
partners may be either life-long friends or strangers.
This framework would also separate marriage from
parenting. Professors Brennan and Cameron make the case
for thinking about “children as a possible basis for family
building, outside the aegis of marriage or even romantic
love.”236 Separating marriage from parenting (“free standing
person marital model, see Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy,
Default Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (2010).
234. Sec. 6 (Partnership Defined).
235. See id. While partnerships do require two or more people, sole
proprietorships allow for organizations to be run by just one person.
236. Samantha Brennan & Bill Cameron, Is Marriage Bad for Children?
Rethinking the Connection Between Having Children, Romantic Love, and
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parenting”) can be viewed as a panacea for various issues in
family law, including the problems arising from
“illegitimate” children, divorce, intestacy, and other issues.
This way, a child may have two “legal parents” for the
relevant purposes, but the parents could be married to each
other and a third person, married separately, or any other
agreed upon combination. As foreign as this may seem, it is
already the reality given the ever-growing divorce rate 237
and growing number of children born out of wedlock.238 The
prevailing policy of tying marriage to parenthood denies
social reality.
We propose our vision and the rough paradigm—not a
comprehensive doctrine—because we understand there are
potential pitfalls that require attention. For example, what
result if twenty people desire to register as a household and
demand health care from the employer of one member of the
household? Such an incidental unwelcome consequence
might require reform of the entire health care system (long
overdue) by, for instance, taking the employer role out of the
healthcare system altogether. How precisely to address such
a difficult broader question is beyond the scope of this
Article. Likewise, as marriage becomes more complicated, so
too, inevitably, does divorce. But continuing with the
partnership analogy, dissolution of associations of large
numbers of people is not impossible. The difficult question of
dissolution of a household is also beyond the scope of this
Article.
History has proven that marriage customs continually
evolve. As non-monogamous unions become more attractive,
Marriage, in AFTER MARRIAGE, supra note 19, at 84, 86.
237. The national divorce rate in 2016 was about 37%. See CTR. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, NATIONAL MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE RATE TRENDS FOR
2000–2016 (2016), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/national_marriage_divorce
_rates_00-16.pdf.
238. In 2014, forty percent of all births took place out of wedlock in the United
States. Joseph Chamie, Out-of-Wedlock Births Rise Worldwide, YALEGLOBAL
ONLINE (Mar. 16, 2017), https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/out-wedlock-birthsrise-worldwide.
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their forms will evolve into more acceptable dynamics. In
other words, the normatively idealized forms of life
associated with these names will be refined and more widely
socially tolerated. For example, legal polygamy “could be
structured in [a] way[] similar to civil monogamy, so that [its]
impact on gender equality and marital privacy would be, at
worst, neutral and, at best, empowering for all involved.”239
The most effective and efficient way for the law to keep
pace with changing “family values” is through contract.
Because family and intimate relationships are highly unique
and individual, they often do not fit within the limitations of
government regulations, and may be more functionally
structured through contracts. Families that do not fit the
traditional mold should not have to wait for government
approval to attain status equivalent to their married
counterparts. Instead, such partners should be able to secure
their rights and status through state recognition.
Recognition of family arrangements through contract is
consistent with cultural and legal momentum, as attitudes
regarding marriage continue to evolve. Expanding “family”
to include the broader array of possibilities of a household
achieves these goals.
III. CONCLUSION
The approach to marriage and the law articulated in this
Article, positing the moral and legal permissibility of nonmonogamous marriage, is part of a growing awareness in the
academy of the coercive, exclusive, restrictive, parochial, and
illiberal features of the prevailing policy. Ruthann Robson’s
article, Compulsory Matrimony, makes the case that because
“U.S. economic policies foster and subsidize the economics of
marriage,” it follows that “the present legal regime operates
as one of the forces that ‘organize’ and ‘manage’ people’s

239. Shrage, supra note 24, at 160–61.
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‘choice’ whether or not to marry.”240 We claim additionally
that while the state should not involve itself in the choice to
marry, it must also not involve itself in the choice among
marriages. Jeremy Garrett argues for a position called
“marital contractualism,” explaining that the State has not
justified its policy of marriage regulation.241 Instead, the
contract paradigm protects: (1) efficiency; (2) equality [state
neutrality]; (3) diversity; and (4) informed consent.242
Finally, Adrienne Davis advocates for the business
partnership model as a workable, precedential solution.243
Perhaps ironically, our approach to marriage and
household formation may likely have the consequence of a
golden age of monogamous marriage. The choice to marry
one person till death under our proposed legal framework
would regain that magical significance. No longer the dry,
default choice, choosing monogamy among alternative
arrangements affirms the unadulterated two-person
romantic union because in such a case, monogamous
marriage is cherished for its inherent value from the point of
view of the participants, not the State.
When Alexis de Tocqueville visited America, he found
small associations of different forms and creeds flourishing
alongside each other. He spoke to representatives of as many
as he could and found that they:
agreed with each other except about details; all thought that the
main reason for the quiet sway of religion over their country was
the complete separation of church and state. I have no hesitation in
stating that throughout my stay in America I met nobody, lay or

240. Robson, supra note 18, at 316.
241. JEREMY GARRETT, A PRIMA FACIE CASE AGAINST CIVIL MARRIAGE (2009).
See also Elizabeth Brake, Marriage and Domestic Partnership, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (July. 11, 2009), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries
/marriage/ (last updated Nov. 29, 2016).
242. Brake, supra note 240.
243. Davis, supra note 232, at 2002–04.
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cleric, who did not agree about that.244

Monogamy, similarly, may just as well flourish under the
separation of church and the marriage paradigm in an
authentically liberal State.

244. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 295 (G. Lawrence trans.,
J. Mayer ed., 1969) (1835).

